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EFFECTS  OF A QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION  AMONG  DOWNSTREAM 
FIRMS DUE TO AN UPSTREAM QUALITY INVESTMENT
SUMMARY
We analyze  the  effects  of  a  quality  differentiation  of  downstream firms  due  to  an 
upstream quality investment.  There is an upstream firm that supplies the intermediate 
goods  to  two  downstream  manufacturers.  Manufacturers  have  different  quality 
efficiencies  and  a  quality  investment  of  upstream  supplier  creates  a  quality 
differentiation  among  the  manufacturers.  The  degree  of  quality  differentiation  is 
important in determining the effects of low quality firm’s quality,  on its rival.  The 
effects are positive when there is significant differentiation. When quality efficiencies 
are close, downstream firms behave almost like identical firms and the quality increase 
of low quality firm affects rival firm negatively.  Also when there is significant quality 
differentiation, increase in investment costs favors the firm with low quality where as 
the  firm  with  high  quality  is  always  negatively  affected.  As  an  extension,  we 
investigate  the effects  of  a different  timing.  Moving first  gives  the firm with high 
quality an opportunity to leave its rival out of the market.
 
vii
TEDARİKÇİNİN  KALİTE  YATIRIMI  SONUCU,  ÜRETİCİLERİN  KALİTE 
FARKLILAŞMASININ ETKİLERİ
ÖZET
Tedarikçi  firmanın  yaptığı  kalite  yatırımı  sonucu,  üretici  firmaların  kalite 
farklılaşmasının  etkilerini  inceledik.  Bir  tedarikçi  firma,  iki  üreticiye  yarı  mamül 
sağlamaktadır.  Üreticilerin kalite verimlilikleri farklıdır, ve tedarikçinin yapacağı bir 
kalite  yatırımı,  üreticiler  arasında  bir  kalite  farklılaşması  yaratır.  Bu  kalite 
farklılaşmasının derecesi, düşük kaliteli firmanın kalitesinin rakibi üzerindeki etkilerini 
belirlemekte önemlidir.  Bu etkiler,  eğer  kaydadeğer  bir  farklılaşma varsa pozitiftir.  
Kalite verimlilikleri yakın ise, firmalar neredeyse aynı şekilde davranır ve bu durumda 
düşük  kaliteli  firmanın  kalitesindeki  bir  artış  rakip  firmayı  negatif  etkiler.  Ayrıca, 
yatırım maliyetlerindeki  artış,  kaydadeğer  bir  kalite  farklılaşması  olduğunda,  düşük 
kaliteli  üreticinin  yararına  olduğu  halde,  yüksek  kaliteye  sahip  üreticiyi  her  zaman 
olumsuz  etkiler.  Ek  olarak,  farklı  zamanlamaların  etkilerini  araştırdık.  İlk  hareket 
etmek, yüksek kaliteli şirkete rakibini piyasanın dışında bırakma şansı verir.
viii
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of a quality differentiation of 
downstream  firms  due  to  an  upstream  quality  investment.  There  are  two 
downstream manufacturer firms in the model, that produce the same product, and an 
upstream firm that supply the manufacturers with the intermediate goods. Upstream 
firm makes a quality investment, to increase the quality level of its intermediate 
goods.  Downstream  firms  have  different  abilities  to  gain  advantage  from  this 
quality investment. We may say that one of the firms has a better infrastructure, has 
a higher knowledge stock or more qualified employees which are not put into use 
when  semi  products  have  basic  quality.  Like  a  better  sword  favors  the  better 
swordsman, a quality increase favors the firm that has more tools to benefit from 
quality. 
For example think of two machine parts manufacturer. Let one of them have a better 
thermal processing facility, which can heat up to higher temperatures compared to 
that  of  the  rival.  If  the  supplier  of  steel  makes  a  quality  investment,  and  start 
producing  a  new  alloy  that  gives  better  strength  after  tempered  at  higher 
temperatures, the firm with a better thermal processing unit becomes advantageous. 
The parts it produces are more rigid compared to that of rival. For another example, 
consider two software companies, one of which has more talented programmers. If 
they are supplied with faster computers, the company with talented programmers 
make a difference, where as a faster computer would mean less to the other firm's 
programmers. Or think of a case where there are two plastic toys manufacturers. In 
the  case  where  the  supplier  of  plastic  makes  a  quality  investment  and  starts 
producing a kind of plastic that is easier to give form, the manufacturer that has 
better designers is favored. Many more examples can be given about the case. 
Of course in real life, the firm that has a better infrastructure, a higher knowledge 
stock or more qualified employees might have a better quality compared to that of 
rival for any given intermediate good quality level. Yet assuming that both firms 
have  same  quality  without  an  upstream investment  is  not  totally  wrong  and  it 
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provides  a  base  point  to  compare  changes  due  to  upstream investment.  Also  it 
makes the model more simple and solvable. 
Within  the  model,  four  decisions  are  made.  Upstream  firm  makes  a  quality 
investment  decision,  and sets  a  wholesales  price.  Downstream firms  make  cost 
reducing investment decisions and set  their  output levels.  All  of these decisions 
affect the whole supply chain. A quality investment of supplier eventually yields 
higher quality final goods, which increases both the demand for downstream final 
goods and upstream intermediate goods. Downstream output level decision affects 
both its  profits  and rival's  profits.  It  also affects  the demand for upstream firm. 
Wholesale  price  decision affects  both manufacturers'  output  decisions,  and their 
demand for intermediate goods. Cost reducing investment of a downstream firm 
provides lower price and an increased output, which increases the demand supplier 
faces.
The main target of this paper is to analyze the effects of a quality differentiation of 
manufacturers due to quality investment which is made by the supplier. Within the 
model, we use a coefficient to represent this differentiation, and we call it "quality 
efficiency".  It  is  a  value  between 0 and 1,  and it  determines  the  percentage  of 
quality investment being used effectively. If we go back to our first example, the 
machine parts  manufacturer  may have a thermal processing unit  that fulfills  the 
needs of the new alloy. In this case, quality efficiency is 1. Or, thermal processing 
unit can heat up to temperatures higher than what is needed for basic alloy, but not 
as much as what is needed for new alloy. In this case, quality efficiency value is in 
somewhere  between  0  and  1.  Both  downstream  firms  have  a  different  quality 
efficiency values, which causes the differentiation between the firms. 
We also examine the effects of investment costs. Within the model, as in real world, 
every investment decision has a cost. An investment might be cheap or expensive 
depending on the cost structure. To investigate this, we use separate coefficients for 
downstream investment and upstream investment. 
Analyzing the model,  we have come to following main results.  If  firms'  quality 
differentiation is not significant, firms behave almost like identical firms, yet, still 
the firm with higher quality efficiency serves to a larger portion of the market. In 
this setting, either firms quality efficiency has a negative effect on the other firm. 
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An increase in quality differentiation favors the firm with high quality efficiency, 
and a decrease in quality differentiation favors the firm with low quality efficiency. 
Think of the toys manufacturers. The firm with better designers wants the other 
firm's designers to have very low talent. By this way, former firm can have a lot 
better toys compared to its rival and make more sales. On the other hand, firm with 
less talented designers wants the other firm's designers to have as low talent as 
possible,  so that  quality of  toys  are  very similar.  Any situation that  widens the 
quality differentiation gap favors the first firm, and any situation that narrows it 
favors the latter. 
If the downstream firms' quality differentiation is quite significant, firm with the 
high quality efficiency dominates the market, leaving the other firm a little portion. 
In this setting, firm with low quality efficiency still wants the quality differentiation 
gap to be as narrow as possible. However the firm with high quality efficiency is 
better off when rival has as high quality efficiency as possible. This may sound 
weird, yet there is a simple explanation. Upstream firm has incentive to invest more 
when downstream firms together can make a better use of it. Thus, dominant firm 
can use every bit of quality increase to its advantage since its rival has a very low 
ability to gain advantage from quality compared to dominant firm. 
Our last findings are about investment costs. As expected, expensive investments 
cause  losses  for  all  three  firms,  unless  quality  differentiation  between  the 
manufacturers  is  very big.  In that case,  the firm with less quality is  favored by 
expensive investments. That is understandable since both upstream and downstream 
investments  reinforce  other  firm's  superiority.  Consider  the  machine  parts 
manufacturers. If one of the manufacturers has a thermal processing unit that can 
not  reach  the  temperatures  new  alloy  needs,  and  its  rival  has  the  sufficient 
equipment, the former would not want upstream to make any quality investment. 
This is because, new alloy makes the firm with outdated technology to serve only to 
a  little  portion  of  the  market.  In  the  case  of  no  quality  investment,  both 
manufacturers share the market equally. 
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1.1 Literature Review
Foros (2004) investigates a similar case where there are two retailers one of which 
is vertically integrated and invests in quality. Both firms have different levels of 
ability to offer value-added services.  His main goal is  to  find effects  of a  price 
regulation on consumer surplus and welfare. Also, he investigates the possibilities 
for integrated firm to use over investment as a foreclosure tool.
Wickelgren (2004) pays  attention to investment incentives when two firms have 
differentiated  products  and they sell  their  goods  through  bargaining.  He uses  a 
linear city model, and adds up holdup problem. By this paper, Wickelgren finds that 
competition can improve incentive for investment.
In their paper, Buehler and Shmutzler (2008) investigates a case where there are 
two upstream firms and two downstream firms. They seek to find the effects both 
vertical integration and cost reducing downstream investment. Their main findings 
are  as  follows.  Vertical  integration  decreases  rivals  innovation  efforts,  thus  not 
integrating vertically is a less likely outcome. Also, they find out that asymmetric 
integration is an equilibrium outcome. 
Erkal  (2007)  investigates  the  effects  of  demand  for  specific  investments  on  a 
downstream duopoly's product variety. She uses an extension of standard hoteling 
model. She finds that for fully specialized suppliers to emerge, downstream firms 
should require specific inputs and they should be willing to make contracts. Also, if 
upstream firms semi products are not specialized, downstream firms produce more 
similar outputs to increase investment incentives for the upstream firm.
In  their  paper,  Banerjee  and  Lin  (2003)  examine  the  incentives  to  make  cost 
reducing  investments  in  a  duopoly.  They  find  that  a  downstream  firm  has  an 
incentive to invest in cost reduction since it increases intermediate goods' price and 
eventually raises rival's cost. Therefore, there is more investment incentive for a 
downstream duopoly compared to a downstream monopoly. They also find that a 
contract  that stabilizes the intermediate goods'  price eliminates the opportunistic 
behavior of upstream supplier and increases welfare. 
Milliou  (2004)  analyzes  the  effects  of  research  and  development  spillovers  on 
innovation incentives of firms, and on welfare. He creates a model where there are 
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two upstream and two downstream firms two of which are vertically integrated. 
There  is  information  flow from downstream firm to  its  rival  through  upstream 
firms. He finds that in a case where both downstream firms make cost reducing 
investments,  the information flow favors the integrated firm and harms the non 
integrated  firm.  He  also  finds  that  if  information  flow  is  not  much,  product 
differentiation is high and investment is not costly, then use of firewalls decreases 
welfare. 
In  his  paper,  Ishii  (2004)  investigates  the  effects  of  cooperative  research  and 
development  in  a  market  with  two  upstream  suppliers  and  two  downstream 
manufacturers.  His  findings  are  as  follows.  Firstly,  if  the  spillover  between the 
upstream firms is not too high, vertical research and development cartel causes a 
higher social welfare than a horizontal research and development cartel. Secondly, 
vertical  research  and  development  cartel  yields  a  higher  welfare  than  a  non-
cooperative research and development in every case. He also finds that a vertical 
research joint venture accelerates tech improvement, thus a vertical research joint 
venture yields largest social welfare if related firms can coordinate. 
In their work, Banerjee and Lin (2001) investigates the incentives for upstream and 
downstream firms  to  form a  research  joint  venture.  They make  a  model  which 
consists of an upstream firm and n number of downstream firms, where upstream 
firm make investments and downstream firms share the investment costs thus, firms 
that  don't  participate  in  cost  sharing  can't  benefit  from  the  investment.  Their 
research shows that upstream firm wants a larger number of firms to be in research 
joint venture compared to the downstream firms. 
Symeonidis (2003) compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria of a duopoly which 
produce differentiated products, and make product research and development. He 
finds  that  firms  have  higher  sales  price  they  achieve  higher  profits  when  they 
compete  for  outputs.  He  also  finds  that,  if  there  is  only  little  spillover  and 
significant product differentiation, total output, consumer surplus and welfare are 
higher  for  Bertrand.  For  the  opposite  case,  total  output,  consumer  surplus  and 
welfare are higher for Cournot equilibrium. One of the main findings of his paper is 
that  in  certain  circumstances,  Cournot  competition  is  better  for  both  firms  and 
consumers than Bertrand competition.
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In his paper,  Toshimitsu (2003) examines a quality differentiated duopoly where 
firms  determine  their  quality  before  production.  He  finds  that  a  research  and 
development subsidy to the firm with high quality increases social welfare and a 
subsidy to the firm with low quality increases welfare only if firms are in a Bertrand 
competition.
In their paper, Lin and Saggi (2002) studies the relationship between cost reducing 
investments  and  product  developing  investments  under  Cournot  and  Bertrand 
competitions. They find that product and process research and development affect 
each  other  positively.  Thus,  cooperation  in  product  development  has  a  positive 
effect  on  both  type  of  investments,  where  as,  cooperation  in  cost  reducing 
investment has a negative effect on both. 
In his work, Aoki (2003) investigates the effects of commitment to quality choice 
on equilibrium qualities and welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. He 
finds that the firm that has the advantage of moving first picks a higher quality thus 
achieves higher profits. 
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2. THE MODEL
As we state in the introduction, our main goal is to explore the consequences of an 
upstream quality investment on downstream firms, when quality investment leads to 
a  quality  differentiation  among  the  downstream firms.  In  our  model,  there  is  a 
single  upstream  supplier  that  supplies  the  downstream  firms  with  intermediate 
goods. Two downstream manufacturers purchase intermediate goods from upstream 
supplier at a price the supplier determines. Manufacturers process the semi products 
and offer final goods to the market. Each manufacturer determines its own output, 
and sales price is determined in the market. Manufacturers also make cost reducing 
investments to become more competitive. Without an upstream quality investment, 
the final products are of basic quality and each downstream firm shares the market 
equally. Figure (2.1) shows the supply chain. 
Figure 2.1: Supply chain of the model
The amount of quality upstream firm achieves after an investment, is not directly 
transferred to customers. Each downstream firm has its own knowledge stock and 
infrastructure which determine the percent of upstream quality transferred to the 
customers.  Therefore,  after  the  investment,  a  quality  differentiation  among  the 
downstream manufacturers occurs. 
In order to model this situation, we use a simplified version of the utility function of 
Toshimitsu  (2003).  In  his  model,   is  used  as  a  multiplier  of  quality  (
U=quality ) and it represents consumer choices of price over quality. In our 
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manufacturer manufacturer
consumers
supplier
model, we assume that there is a single consumer choice of price over quality and it 
is same for every individual in the market. Consumers are instead defined by their 
maximum willingness to  pay,  which is  represented by   .  In this  respect,  the 
utility of a consumer is as follows:
U=  { 1 > θ > 0 } (2.1)
where θ represents consumer type, and it is homogeneously distributed between 0 
and 1.
The surplus of nth consumer who buys a single unit of product is:
S=nq−p (2.2)
where q represents initial quality, and p represents initial price of the product. Since 
the  downstream  firms  are  identical,  there  is  only  a  single  sales  price.  If  this 
consumer buys one unit of the product, he/she benefits from the quality and suffers 
from the price of the product. If the difference between price and quality is bigger 
than  this  consumer's  willingness  to  pay ( n )  ,  then  he/she  does  not  make  a 
purchase. 
We use the model Foros (2004) uses to define downstream firms' ability to offer 
value  added  services  to  create  a  quality  differentiation.  After  an  upstream 
investment, supplier increases its intermediate goods quality by y amount. However, 
downstream firms can transfer only a certain percent (  ) of this quality to the 
market. Hence, consumer n who buys a single unit of product from firm i has the 
following surplus:
Sn=nq y∗i−P i (2.3)
where  y,  βi and  Pi indicate  upstream  investment,  downstream  firm  i's  quality 
efficiency and firm i's sales price respectively. If this consumer buys from firm j, 
then he has the following surplus:
Sn=nq y∗ j−P j (2.4)
where  βj and  Pj indicate  downstream firm j's  quality  efficiency and sales  price 
respectively.
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Here we make the assumption in Foros (2004). Since consumers are homogenous in 
their evaluation of quality, prices of downstream firms should be equal once the 
effect of quality is removed. Otherwise firms can not be active in the market at the 
same time.
P=P i− y∗i=P j− y∗ j (2.5)
It is obvious that surplus should be non negative for any consumer to buy a unit of 
product. So we can say that the last consumer that buys one unit of product from 
firm i has zero surplus after the transaction. 
 Smin=minq−P=0 (2.6)
Rearranging equation (2.6):
min=P−q (2.7)
Since we know from equation (2.1) that consumers are distributed between 1 and 0, 
we can say that the total number of goods sold (total demand) is:
X total=1−min (2.8)
If we substitute equation (2.7) in (2.8), then we have:
X total=1q−P (2.9)
Then we substitute quality adjusted prices of firm i and firm j in equation (2.5) for p 
in equation (2.9) and find demand functions both downstream firm faces:
X total=1q y∗i−P i (2.10)
X total=1q y∗ j−P j (2.11)
Since  Xi+  Xj =  Xtotal,  rearranging  equations  (2.10)  and  (2.11)  we  find  inverse 
demand functions as follows:
P i=1q−X i−X j y∗i (2.12)
P j=1q−X i−X j y∗ j (2.13)
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As it can easily be seen, both initial quality and quality due to an investment has a  
positive impact on sales prices, where as quantities of downstream firms have a 
negative effect.
Upstream firm supplies downstream firms with intermediate product. Downstream 
firms process intermediate product and manufacture final good. The price of final 
good is determined within the market through the inverse demand functions (2.12) 
and (2.13). We assume that for both upstream and downstream firms, marginal costs 
of  production  are  zero  (c=0).  Upstream firm charges  downstream firms  with  a 
wholesale price w. Both supplier and manufacturer have quadratic investment costs. 
The profit function of supplier is:
up=w  X iX j−k y2 (2.14)
First term of the equation is total revenue of the upstream firm, second term is the 
total cost of investment.  y represents the amount of quality investment upstream 
firm makes and coefficient k represents the marginal cost of investment. If k is high, 
total cost of investment is high. (and vice versa). We assume k>1 so that the second 
order conditions hold. 
Downstream firms have the following profit functions:
 i=X i P i−wni−m ni2 (2.15)
 j=X jP j−wn j−m n j2 (2.16)
In both equations, first term is total revenue whereas second term is the total cost of 
cost reducing investment.  n i and  n j  are cost reducing investments of firm i 
and firm j respectively. Coefficient m represents the marginal cost of investment. If 
m is high, total cost of investment is high (and vice versa). We assume that m>1 so 
that the second order conditions hold. 
Our model consists of a four stage game. In the first stage, upstream firm decides 
quality investment level, in the second stage, downstream firms decide their cost 
reducing investment levels simultaneously, in the third stage, upstream firm decides 
wholesale  price  and in  the  forth  stage,  downstream firms  compete  in  quantities 
(firms  choose  their  quantities  simultaneously).  We  assume  that  there  is  perfect 
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information. We solve the model with backwards induction method. Figure (2.2) 
shows the timing of the model.
Figure 2.2: Timing of the game
4th stage
In this  stage of the game,  both downstream firms determine the quantities  they 
produce. Profit functions of the firms are given in equations (2.15) and (2.16). If we 
set  the  first  order  conditions  of  these  functions  equal  to  zero,  we  obtain  the 
following reaction functions:
∂ i
∂ X i
=1q−wni−2Xi−x j y i=0 X i=
1q−wni− x j y i
2
(2.17)
 j
 X j
=1q−wn j−X i−2x j y  j=0 X j=
1q−wn j−x i y  j
2
(2.18)
If  we  solve  equations  (2.17)  and  (2.18)  for  the  Cournot-Nash  Equilibrium,  we 
obtain:
X i
c=1
3
1−cq−w2n i−n j2yi− y  j
(2.19)
X j
c=1
3
1−cq−w2n j−ni2y j− y i
(2.20)
(Superscript c indicates the equilibrium values of the fourth stage)
We  have  to  check  for  second  order  conditions  to  make  sure  profit  function  is 
concave with respect to quantities. Second order conditions should be negative for a 
maximum:
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1st stage 2nd stage 4th stage
Upstream 
firm chooses 
quality 
investment 
level y .
Downstream 
firms choose cost 
reducing 
investment levels 
n i , n j .
Upstream 
frm chooses 
wholesales 
price w .
3rd stage
Downstream 
firms choose 
their output 
levels
x i , x j .
∂2 i
∂ X i
2 =−20
∂2 j
∂ X j
2 =−20 (2.21)
Equation (2.21) ensures that profit function is concave with respect to quantities 
(X). We also have to check the stability of the equilibrium. For the equilibrium to be 
stable and unique, the following condition should hold:

∂2 i
∂ X i
2 ∗
∂2 j
∂ X j
2 
∂2 i
∂ X i X j
∗
∂2 j
∂ X i X j
 (2.22)
Left part of the inequality yields 4, and right part of the inequality yields 1 so the 
stability condition holds. 
3rd stage
In  this  stage  of  the  game,  upstream firm determines  its  wholesale  price.  Profit 
function  of  the  upstream  firm  is  given  in  equation  (2.14).  Substituting  the 
equilibrium  outputs  in  equations  (2.19)  and  (2.20)  into  profit  function  of  the 
upstream firm, we obtain:
u
c=1
3
2w2qw−2w2−3ky2w niw n jw y iw y  j (2.23)
Setting first order conditions equal to zero and solving for wholesale price, gives us 
the wholesale price which maximizes the upstream profit. 
∂u
c
∂w
=1
3
22q−4wnin j yi y  j=0
ww=1
4
22qnin j y i y  j (2.24)
(Superscript w indicates the equilibrium values of the third stage)
Second order conditions should be negative for a maximum:
∂2u
c
∂w2
=− 4
3
0 (2.25)
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Equation (2.25) shows us that second order condition is satisfied.
2nd stage
In the second stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose their cost reducing 
investment levels to maximize their profit. We substitute the equilibrium wholesale 
price and equilibrium quantities into the profit functions and obtain:
 i
w= 1
144
49−144mni
214ni AA
2
A=22q−5n j7yi−5y  j (2.26)
 i
w= 1
144
49−144mn j
214n jTT
2
T=22q−5ni7y  j−5y i (2.27)
Differentiating  i
w with respect to n i , and  j
w with respect to n j , setting 
them  equal  to  zero  and  solving  for  n i and n j ,  we  obtain  the  following 
investment reaction functions:
n i=
722q−5n j7yi−5y j
−49−144m
(2.28)
n j=
722q−5n i−5yi7y j
−49−144m 
(2.29)
Solving equations (2.28) and (2.29) simultaneously, equilibrium investment levels 
can be found as follows:
n i
d=
7−712m−7q12mq−7yi42 m y i−30m y  j
49−588m864m2
(2.30)
n j
d=
7−712m−7q12mq−30m y i−7y  j42m y  j
49−588m864m2
(2.31)
(Superscript d indicates the equilibrium values of the second stage)
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We have  to  check  for  second  order  conditions  to  make  sure  profit  function  is 
concave with respect to cost reducing investment levels. Second order conditions 
should be negative for a maximum.
∂2 i
w
∂ ni
2 =
49
72
−2m0 (2.32)
∂2 j
w
∂ n j
2 =
49
72
−2m0 (2.33)
Since  m>1,  second  order  conditions  are  satisfied.  Equations  (2.32)  and  (2.33) 
ensure  that  profit  function  is  concave  with  respect  to  cost  reducing  investment 
levels  (n).  We  also  have  to  check  the  stability  of  the  equilibrium.  For  the 
equilibrium to be stable and unique, the following condition should hold:

∂2 i
w
∂ ni
2 ∗
∂2 j
w
∂ n j
2 
∂2 i
w
∂ ni n j
∗
∂2 j
w
∂ ni n j
 (2.34)
The left part of inequality (2.33) yields  49
72
−2m
2
, right part of the inequality 
yields 
1225
5184 . Since m>1, stability condition is satisfied. 
1st Stage
In this stage, the upstream firm chooses its quality investment level. Substituting the 
equilibrium  outputs,  equilibrium  wholesale  price  and  equilibrium  downstream 
investment levels into the profit function of the upstream firm, we obtain:
u
d=
864m21q2−k 7−72m2 y2216m2 y i j44q y i y  j
7−72m2
(2.35)
Upstream firm maximizes its profit with respect to quality investment level (y), so:
∂u
d
∂ y
=
k 7−72m2 y−216m2 i j22q y i y j
−772m
=0 (2.36)
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If we solve for y:
yu=
432m21q i j
−k 7−72m 2216m2i j
2 (2.37)
(Superscript u indicates the equilibrium values of the third stage)
Second order conditions should be negative for a maximum:
∂2u
d
∂ y2
=
−2k 7−72m2432m2i j
2
7−72m2
0 (2.38)
Equation (2.38) is always smaller than zero when m>1, k>1, and 1i j , so 
second order condition is satisfied.
All equilibrium values for endogenous variables can be found in the appendix.
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3. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS
Our goal is to investigate the effects of quality differentiation due to an upstream 
quality investment, among the downstream firms. We construct a model that serves 
our intentions and solve it in section 2. In this section, we make a comparative static 
analysis  of the model to  see the effects  of exogenous variables (k,  m,  i and 
 j ) on endogenous variables ( X i , X j , n i , n j , P i , P j , w , y ).
3.1 The Effects of Firm i's Quality Efficiency ( i )
It is best to explore the effect of firm i's quality efficiency on firm i's sales price 
since i affects it directly. As given in in equation (2.11), quality has a positive 
effect on firm i's inverse demand function. The quality firm i offers to its customers 
is y i which is only i percent of the upstream quality investment. An increase 
in own quality efficiency causes an upward shift of the demand firm i faces. An 
upward shift increases the price firm i can sell its products in the market. Although, 
bigger profit margin, which is caused by high prices, gives an incentive to produce 
more outputs, the decrease in prices due to output increase is less than the increase 
in prices due to the shift of the demand curve. So we can say that an increase in firm 
i's quality efficiency increases its sales price. (See Appendix A.4 ln[87])
Increased sales price, due to increased own quality efficiency directly affects the 
output of firm i. It is easy to see in firm i's profit function in equation (2.14) that the 
profit margin of the firm is related to sales price, upstream wholesale price and own 
cost reducing investment level. Once sales price increases, firm i's profit margin 
grows.  An  increased  profit  margin,  gives  firm  i  an  incentive  to  increase  its 
production. To sum up, an increase in firm i's quality efficiency increases its own 
output level (See Appendix A.4ln[88]).
As firm i's  quality efficiency increases,  the price it  can supply its  goods to  the 
market increases. This gives firm i an incentive to produce more. Even though there 
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exists a negative effect on market price due to increased output, the positive effect 
caused by increase in quality is still higher. Therefore, firm i's profit is higher for 
higher levels of quality it can offer (See Appendix A.4ln[89]).
A higher i means, firm i can offer more quality to its customers. Quality increase 
yields and upward shift on the demand curve firm i faces, which enables firm i to 
sell its products at higher prices, thus gives firm i a higher profit margin and profit. 
As its profit increases, firm i has more resources to make cost reducing investments. 
Firm  i's  investment  level  increases  as  own  quality  efficiency  increases  (See 
Appendix A.4ln[90]). This also affects firm i's output level. Firm i's profit margin 
increases due to cost reduction. Since it is more profitable, firm i chooses a higher 
output level. 
Following proposition helps  us explain firm i's  quality efficiency's  effect  on the 
rival firm's sales price:
Proposition 1.1:  If  i  and   j  are sufficiently close, inefficient firm's sales 
price increases with the quality efficiency level of the rival. 
Proof: Derivative of P j
u with respect to i is:
∂P j
u
∂i
=
−432m2 1q −216m2i
2 j24i k −772m−18m j
2− j∗A
k 7−72m2−216m2 i j 
2

2
A=k −748m−772m216m2 j
2 (3.1)
The sign of equation (3.42) is determined by the following equation (See Appendix 
A.4ln[91]): 
 j k −748m −772m 216m
2i
2 j
2−24mik −772m−18m j
2
(3.2)
The result  of equation (3.43) is  positive when  i1.7 j  and it  is  negative 
when i≥2.3 j  (k>1, m>1, q>0 and 1i j ), (See Appendix A.4 ln[92] 
ln[93]).
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Figure (3.1) shows that P j
ui function is concave. Firm j's sales price increases 
for an increase of  i  at lower values of  i and decreases for an increase of 
i  at higher values of i .
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Figure 3.1: Change of firm j's sales price by i
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.5
Although it sounds odd, there is a simple explanation for this relation between firm 
j's price and rival's quality efficiency. Increase in  i gives upstream firm more 
incentive to invest in quality. As upstream firm invests more, firm j's quality level 
and prices increase. Although, high  i yields high total output, and increase in 
total  output  makes  a  negative effect  on price,  the  positive effect  due to  quality 
increase is higher as long as there isn't a significant difference in i and  j . If 
the gap between two downstream firms quality efficiencies widen, negative effect 
due to increase in total output is too much because of high i  and the positive 
effect due to quality increase is too small due to low quality efficiency of firm j, 
thus firm j's price level declines. 
A high quality efficiency, enables firm i to produce more outputs and as a result, 
supply a bigger portion of the consumers. As i increases, the market portion of 
firm i gets even bigger, leaving less consumers to firm j. Also, a high i yields 
high profits for firm i, enabling it to invest more on cost reduction compared to firm 
j. Lower production costs also help firm i to dominate the market, causing firm j to 
stay on low outputs. Although an increase in  i  causes upstream firm to make 
more quality investment, this positive effect makes a little difference for firm j. As a 
result,  firm j's  output  level  decreases  as  rivals  quality  efficiency increases  (See 
Appendix  A.4 ln[94]).  Even if  the  quality efficiencies  of  both firms have close 
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values, meaning price of firm j is affected positively by rivals quality efficiency 
increase, the result does not change. 
An increase in firm i's quality efficiency yields an upward shift of the demand for 
firm i. This shift enables firm i to sell at a higher sales price, which results in having 
firm i to have an incentive to produce more. Firm i supplies a bigger portion of the 
demand and firm j's output decreases. Even though firm j benefits higher price for 
higher levels of i when i and  j are not significantly different, the greater 
negative effect due to low outputs causes a reduction in firm j's profit. Firm j's profit 
decreases as rivals quality efficiency increases (See Appendix A.4 ln[95]).
High quality efficiency of firm i enables firm i to offer its customers higher quality, 
which shifts  the demand it  faces  upwards.  Elevated demand yields  high market 
price, thus high output, making firm j to produce less output. As the gap between 
two firms' quality efficiencies widen, firm j's portion of the market gets smaller and 
its profit decreases. As a result, firm j doesn't have much sources to spare for cost 
reducing investment. So, we can say that an increase in firm i's quality efficiency 
decreases rivals investment level (See Appendix A.4 ln[96]). 
Before we talk about firm i's quality efficiency's effect on upstream firm, we have to 
make a point on how i  affects total output. As we discuss earlier, an increase in 
i  increases firm i's output, but decreases firm j's output. However the changes 
in downstream firms' output levels are not the same. The effect of i  on firm i's 
output is a direct effect, where as the effect on firm j's output is an indirect effect. 
Therefore, the change in firm i's output exceeds the change in firm j's output. As a 
result, total output increases as i increases (See Appendix A.4 ln[97]).
Increase  of  i affects  upstream wholesales  price  in  two  ways.  First  of  all,  a 
higher  i increases the demand for the product, which causes downstream firm 
do increase its  output.  More output means,  more input,  so the downstream firm 
demands more intermediate product from the upstream firm. As the demand for the 
intermediate  product  increases,  upstream firm chooses  a higher  wholesale  price. 
Second effect of i  on wholesale price is indirect. Since a higher i increases 
downstream profits through increased demand and increased prices, the downstream 
firm  has  more  incentive  to  make  cost  reducing  investment.  Cost  reducing 
investment enables the firm to increase its output further more, which as a result 
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increases  the  demand  for  the  intermediate  product  further  more  and  makes  the 
upstream firm choose a higher wholesale price .  We can say that an increase in 
i inreases upstream wholesales price  (See Appendix A.4 ln[98]).
An increase  in  firm i's  quality  efficiency,  increases  its  own output  level  and it 
reduces the rivals output level. Increase in its own output is greater than decrease in 
rivals output, as a result, total output increases. An increase in total output yields a 
greater  demand  for  intermediate  goods,  enabling  upstream supplier  to  choose  a 
higher wholesale price. Increased output level and high wholesale price increases 
upstream firm's profit. So the effect of firm i's quality efficiency on upstream profit 
is positive (See Appendix A.4 ln[99]).
i represents  the  percentage  of  upstream  quality  investment  transmitted  to 
consumers.  A  higher  i means,  upstream  quality  investment  is  used  more 
efficiently.  An increase in  i affects  upstream investment  level in three ways. 
First effect is caused by the increase in output of the downstream firms. Second 
effect  is  a  result  of  upstream  firm  charging  higher  wholesales  prices  due  to 
increased  effect  of  of  quality  investment.  Third,  as  downstream firms  are  more 
quality  efficient,  they  have  higher  profits  due  to  increased  prices  and  outputs. 
Higher profits enable them to do more cost reducing investments,  which further 
increases their outputs. An increased output level and an increased wholesale price 
enables the upstream firm to make more profit thus have more resources to invest 
more in quality. We can easily say that an increase in firm i's quality efficiency 
increases upstream investment level (See Appendix A.4 ln[100]).
3.2 The Effects of Firm j's Quality Efficiency (  j )
It is best to start exploring the effects of firm j's quality efficiency on firm j's sales 
price. Firm j faces an inverse demand function, that y  j affects directly. A high 
quality efficiency enables firm j to offer more quality to its customers. As a result 
firm j  faces an elevated demand curve.  Shifted demand enables firm j  to ell  its 
products  at  higher  prices.  Although,  higher  prices  gives  firm  j  an  incentive  to 
produce more, which causes a negative effect on price, the positive effect due to 
quality increase is greater. So, firm j's sales price increases as own quality efficiency 
increases (See Appendix A.4 ln[112]).
21
A quality investment shifts the demand curve upwards. Since  j  determines firm 
j's ability to gain advantage from an upstream investment, it is the main factor that 
identifies the level of shift together with the upstream investment level. A higher 
 j  yields a bigger shift. A bigger shift enables firm j to sell at a higher sales 
price, which gives the firm an incentive to increase its output level (See Appendix 
A.4 ln[113]).
If firm j's quality efficiency increases, the firm faces a shifted demand curve, which 
enables it to sell at a higher sales price. Increased demand yields increased output 
level for firm i thus an increased total output. Increased output makes the upstream 
firm to charge a higher wholesale price, yet it also makes the upstream firm invest 
more on quality. The negative effect of increased wholesale price is exceeded by the 
positive  effects  of  increased  output,  higher  price  and  increased  upstream 
investment,  so  firm  j's  profit  increases  as   j increases  (See  Appendix  A.4 
ln[114]).
As we state above, as firm j's quality efficiency increases, its profit increases due to 
two factors. First of all, firm j's sales price increases due to a quality increase. Also, 
firm j can supply more output to the market due to shifted demand caused by high 
quality. If firm j achieves to gain high profit, it can spare more resources on cost 
reducing investments. So we can say that investment level of firm j is positively 
affected by an increase in own quality efficiency (See Appendix A.4 ln[115]).
Unlike the effect of i on firm j's sales price, an increase in  j always affects 
firm i's sales price positively (See Appendix A.4 ln[102]). As we discuss earlier, an 
increase in quality efficiency of one downstream firm affects rivals sale price in two 
ways. First one is a negative effect due to an increased output, and the second one is 
a positive effect due to an increased upstream quality investment. Since firm i has 
higher  quality  efficiency,  an  increased  quality  investment  always  favors  firm i. 
Therefore, the positive effect always exceeds the negative effect, and firm i's sales 
price increases as rival's quality efficiency increases. 
Following proposition helps  us explain firm j's  quality efficiency's  effect  on the 
rival firm's output level:
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Proposition 1.2:  If  i  and   j  are sufficiently close,  efficient firm's output 
level decreases as the quality efficiency level of the rival firm increases. 
Proof: Derivative of X i
u with respect to  j is 
∂ X i
u
∂ j
=
5184m3 1q−H i
3
60k 7−72mm j−432m
2i
2 ji A−H  j
2

−712m k 7−72m 
2
−216m2 i j
2

2
A=k −712m−772m 
H=216m2 (3.3)
And the sign of equation (3.3) depends on the sign of following equation:  (See 
Appendix A.4 ln[103])
216m 2i
360k 7−72mm j432m
2i
2 ji k −712m−772m216m
2 j
2
(3.4)
Sign  of  equation  (3.4)  is  positive  when  i12 j and  it  is  negative  when 
i≤3.5 j  for k>1, m>1, q>0 and 1i j  (See Appendix A.4 ln[104] and 
[105]).
Figure (3.2) shows that X i
u j function has a maximum at  j=0.15 . 
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Figure 3.2: Change of firm i''s output level by i
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1, i=0.8
Increase in quality efficiency of firm j affects firm i's output level in a couple of 
ways.  First,  there is a direct effect due to increase in firm j's output level.  This 
causes firm i to choose a lower output level. Secondly, there is an indirect effect due 
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to  upstream quality investment  increase.  When there isn't  a  considerable quality 
differentiation, the indirect effect is so slight, it does not exceed the direct effect. 
However, in the case where quality differentiation is great, the negative effect is 
slight and the positive effect exceeds it. In this scenario, firm j shares a very tiny 
portion of the market, and an increase in its output barely affects firm i. Although, 
the increase in upstream quality investment is proportionally small as well, firm i 
makes a good use of it due to its superior quality efficiency. 
Following proposition helps  us explain firm j's  quality efficiency's  effect  on the 
rival firm's profit:
Proposition  1.3:  If  i  and   j  are  sufficiently  close,  efficient  firm's  profit 
decreases as the quality efficiency level of the rival firm increases. 
Proof: Derivative of  i
u with respect to  j is 
∂ i
u
∂ j
=
864m3−49144m 1q2 AH i
2
− j
2
T 
−712m k 7−72m 
2
−216m2 i j
2

2
A=k −712m−772m 
H=216m2
T=−H i
360k 7−72m m j−432m
2i
2 ji A−H  j
2 (3.5)
And the sign of equation (3.5) depends on the sign of following equation:  (See 
Appendix A.4 ln[106])
216m2i
360k 7−72mm j432m
2i
2 ji k −712m −772m216m
2 j
2
(3.6)
Sign  of  equation  (3.6)  is  positive  when  i12 j and  it  is  negative  when 
i≤3.5 j  for k>1, m>1, q>0 and 1i j  (See Appendix A.4 ln[107] and 
[108]).
Figure (3.3) shows that  i
u j function has a maximum at  j=0.15 . 
24
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
 j
0.1100
0.1105
0.1110
0.1115
0.1120
0.1125
i
U
i
U  j
Figure 3.3: Change of firm i's profit by  j
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1, i=0.8
This effect of  j on firm i's profit is directly proportional to the effect of  j on 
firm i's output. As it can be seen in the profit function of firm i in equation (2.14) 
the  profit  of  firm  is  directly  affected  by  firm  i's  output  level.  Therefore,  the 
conditions we discuss earlier  for firm i's  output level applies directly to firm i's 
profit. In the cases where firm i's output shows a decline due to an increase in rivals 
quality efficiency, firm i's profit also shows a decline (and vice versa).
The conditions that we come up as we explore  j effects on firm i's output level 
and  profit  show  themselves  as  we  investigate  the  effects  of  firm  j's  quality 
efficiency on firm i's investment level, thus we make the following proposition:
Proposition 1.4: If i  and  j  are sufficiently close, efficient firm's investment 
level decreases as the quality efficiency level of the rival firm increases. 
Proof: Derivative of n i
u with respect to  j is 
∂ ni
u
∂ j
=
3024m21q−H i
360k 7−72mm j−432m
2i
2 ji A−H  j
2
−712m k 7−72m2−216m2 i j
22
A=k −712m−772m 
H=216m2
(3.7)
And the  sign of  equation  (3.7)  depends on the sign of  following equation (See 
Appendix A.4 ln[109]):
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216m2i
360k 7−72mm j432m
2i
2 ji k −712m −772m216m
2 j
2
(3.8)
Sign  of  equation  (3.8)  is  positive  when  i12 j and  it  is  negative  when 
i≤3.5 j  for k>1, m>1, q>0 and 1i j  (See Appendix A.4 ln[110] and 
[111]).
Figure (3.4) shows that n i
u j function has a maximum at  j=0.15 . 
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Figure 3.4: Change of firm i's investment level by  j
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1, i=0.8
As we discuss earlier output and profit of firm i are affected positively from an 
increase in rival's quality efficiency if  quality differentiation among the firms is 
very large, and affected negatively when quality differentiation is not significant. 
The  same  conditions  apply  when  we  examine  the  effects  of   j  on  firm i's 
investment  level.  This  is  predictable  since  firms  spare  resources  for  investment 
proportional  to  their  profits.  If  profit  of  a  firm  has  tendency  to  decrease,  the 
investment level of the firm has the same tendency (and vice versa).
3.3 The Effects of Upstream Investment Cost ( k )
The effects of k are more direct for upstream firm compared to the downstream 
firms since it is upstream firm's investment cost. Therefore, it is best to start by 
examining the  effects  of  k  on the  upstream firm.  k represents  the  efficiency of 
upstream  quality  investment.  If  k  increases,  upstream  investment  becomes 
inefficient and expensive. Therefore, an increase in k decreases upstream quality 
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investment  level (See  Appendix  A.4  ln[136]). If  investment  cost  of  upstream 
investment is high, upstream firm decreases its quality investment level. A decrease 
in quality shifts the demand curve which downstream firms face, down, causing 
downstream  firms  to  produce  less  output.  Decreased  output  means  decreased 
intermediate product demand, and decreased intermediate product demand causes 
upstream firm to charge a  lower  wholesale  price.  So,  upstream wholesale  price 
decreases as upstream investment cost increases (See Appendix A.4 ln[134]).
A  decrease  in  upstream  firm's  quality  investment  due  to  increased  cost  of 
investment,  decreases  the total  output  and makes upstream firm choose a  lower 
wholesales price. Also, a bigger portion of upstream firm's profit disappears through 
investment costs. The indirect effect of decreased output plus decreased wholesale 
price,  and  the  direct  effect  of  high  investment  cost  causes  upstream  profit  to 
decrease as k increases (See Appendix A.4 ln[135]).
The effects of upstream investment cost is  carried to downstream firms through 
changes in quality investment level. A high investment cost yields low quality and a 
low  investment  cost  yields  high  quality.  Firm  i  is  negatively  affected  from an 
upstream quality investment cost increase since quality investment is what creates a 
quality differentiation among the firms. Quality differentiation favors firm i since it 
has  a  higher  quality  efficiency  and  as  a  result,  higher  quality.  A decrease  in 
upstream investment level caused by increased upstream investment cost reduces 
the quality firm i offers its customers. Reduced quality decreases the demand for 
firm i's product, causing the sales price to decrease. A low sales price yields lower 
profit margins, causing firm i to cut itself on production, and choose a lower output 
level.  So,  an  increase  in  k  decreases  firm  i's  output  level (See  Appendix  A.4 
ln[122]).
Increase  in  upstream investment  cost  causes  a  decrease  in  upstream investment 
level. This reduction affects firm i's sale price in two ways. First effect is the direct 
effect  of  quality on sales  price  which  is  negative due to  quality reduction.  The 
second effect is positive and it is a result of decreased overall output. The direct 
effect of quality exceeds the indirect effect of quantity, so sales price is negatively 
affected from an upstream investment cost increase (See Appendix A.4 ln[121]).
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As it can be seen in profit function of firm i in equation (2.14), profit of the firm i is 
affected positively by firm i's output and sales price and it is affected negatively by 
upstream wholesale  price.  We state  that  firm i's  sale  price  and output  level  are 
negatively affected by an increase in upstream investment cost. We also indicate 
that an increase in k decreases the wholesale price of upstream firm.  Although, 
reduction in wholesale price favors firm i's profit a little, the negative effects of low 
price and low output level are far greater. As a result, firm i's output level decreases 
as upstream investment cost increases (See Appendix A.4 ln[123]).
Firm with high   achieves high price and output level as a result of increased 
quality due to an upstream quality investment. High price and output level yields 
high  profits,  thus  more  opportunity  to  invest  on  cost  reduction.  If  upstream 
investment cost increases, quality level decreases lowering price, output, profit and 
investment level of firm i (See Appendix A.4 ln[124]).
When we explore the effects of upstream investment cost on firm j, we see that the 
effects can be negative or positive depending on the quality efficiency of the firm. A 
general conclusion for the following four analysis is that an increase in upstream 
investment cost makes firm j better of if the quality differentiation among the firms 
is significantly large. With this in mind, we can move on to our next proposition:
Proposition 1.5:  If  i  and   j  are sufficiently close, inefficient firm's sales 
price decreases as the investment cost of upstream firm increases. 
Proof: Derivative of P j
u with respect to k is:
∂P j
u
∂ k
=
432m 2−772m1qi j12m i7−60m j
k 7−72m2−216m 2i j
22 (3.9)
this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of  (See Appendix A.4 
ln[125]):
12mi7−60m j
(3.10)
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It is positive when i≥5 j and negative when i≤4.4 j while k>1, q>0 and 
1i j  (See Appendix A.4 ln[126] and [127]). The values of i and  j
that is outside the given conditions tend inconclusive results.
Figures (3.5) and (3.6) show P j
uk  functions for two different situations.
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Figure 3.5: Change of firm j's sales price by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.5 i=0.8
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Figure 3.6: Change of firm j's sales price by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.15 i=0.8
A reduction in upstream investment level because of an increase in investment cost 
decreases downstream sales prices thus output levels. If downstream firms' quality 
efficiencies  are  not  significantly  different,  the  direct  negative  effect  of  quality 
decrease on firm j's price exceeds the indirect positive effect of reduced output on 
price and firm j's sales price falls. However, in the case where   j is very low 
compared to i , indirect positive effect of output decrease on firm j's sales price 
exceeds the direct negative effect quality decrease on sales price. As a result, this 
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time firm j's sales price is affected positively from an increase in upstream firm's 
investment cost. 
Following proposition helps  us explain upstream investment  cost's  effect  on the 
firm j's output level.
Proposition 1.6:  If  i  and   j  are sufficiently close, inefficient firm's output 
level decreases as the investment cost of upstream firm increases. 
Proof: Derivative of X j
u with respect to k is:
∂ X j
u
∂ k
=
5184m3−772m1q i j30m i71−6m  j
−712mk 7−72m2−216m 2i j
22
(3.11)
and this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of (See Appendix 
A.4 ln[128]):
30mi71−6m  j . (3.12)
It is positive when  i≥1.4 j  and negative when  i≤1.1 j  while k>1, q>0 
and 1i j  (See Appendix A.4 ln[129] and [130]).
Figure (3.7) and (3.8) show X j
uk  functions for two different situations.
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Figure 3.7: Change of firm j's output level by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.7 i=0.8
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Figure 3.8: Change of firm j's output level by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.5 i=0.8
If two downstream firms' quality efficiencies are not significantly different, firm j 
suffers  from  a  reduction  of  upstream  quality  due  to  an  increase  in  upstream 
investment cost. Although firm j serves to a lower portion of the market due to its 
low quality efficiency, it still benefits from a quality increase. However when  j
and  i are significantly different, firm j serves only to a limited portion of the 
market. Rival firm benefits a lot more from a quality investment compared to firm j. 
As a result, a decrease in quality investment level reduces the negative effects of 
low  j for the firm j. Its output level increases even though total output is less. 
As we discuss earlier, output of a firm is directly proportional to its profit level and 
investment of a firm is directly proportional to its profit. 
The conditions that explain how upstream investment cost affects firm j's output 
level are exactly the same as the conditions that explain upstream investment cost's 
effects on firm j's profit and investment level. 
Signs  of  derivatives  of  X j
u ,   j
u , n j
u with  respect  to  k depends  on  a 
condition which is same for all three derivatives. 
∂ X j
u
∂ k
=
5184m3−772m1q i j30m i71−6m  j
−712mk 7−72m2−216m 2i j
22
(3.11)
∂ j
u
∂ k
=
864m 3−772m1q2−49144mi jT AH i
2 j
2
7−12m2k 7−72m2−216m2i j
23
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A=k −712m−772m 
H=216m2
T=30mi71−6m  j (3.13)
∂n j
u
∂ k
=
3024m2−772m 1qi j30mi71−6m  j
−712m k 7−72m2−216m 2i j
22 (3.14)
All  parts  of  the  three  equations  are  clearly  positive  (  while  k>1,  q>0  and 
1i j )  except  the  following  part:  (See  Appendix  A.4  ln[128],  [131]  and 
[132])
30mi71−6m  j (3.15)
Equation (3.15) yields a positive result  when  i≥1.4 j  and a negative result 
when i≤1.1 j . And since it is present in all three derivatives, we can say that 
upstream  investment  cost  affects  firm  j's  output,  firm  j's  profit  and  firm  j's 
investment level in parallel courses. 
If  upstream investment  cost  increases,  upstream firm's  quality  investment  level 
decreases. A decrease in quality causes a downward shift of the demand curve that 
downstream  firms  face.  This  downward  shift  yields  lower  sales  price,  which 
reduces  downstream  firms'  output  productions.  When  quality  efficiencies  of 
downstream firms are close, reduced output and low prices lower both firm i's and 
firm j's profits and when firm j's profit decreases, firm j has less resources to spend 
on  cost  reducing  investment.  However,  when  downstream  firm's   's  are 
significantly different, firm firm i gains a significant advantage over firm j through 
quality investment and dominates the market using its superior quality. In this case, 
any decrease in upstream quality investment suppresses this advantage firm i has 
and favors firm j. Firm j's profits increase thus it has more resources to invest in 
cost reduction due to increased profit. 
3.4 The Effects of Downstream Investment Cost ( m )
A firm makes an investment  only if  it  is  efficient  and profitable.  If  the cost  of 
downstream investment increases, it makes the investment inefficient. For a given 
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level of investment, firm has to pay more research cost. In this sense we can say 
that,  firm i's  investment  level  decreases  as  cost  of  investment  increases.   (See 
Appendix A.4 ln[144]).
Investment reduces production costs and causes an increase in firm i's output level. 
Firm i,  which has a better  quality in every case,  uses investment to enhance its 
superiority over firm j. Firm i has better quality which leads to higher sales price, 
higher output and as a result higher profit compared to its rival. Since firm i has 
more resources to invest in cost reduction, it uses investment as a tool to dominate 
the market even more. If cost reducing investments are not efficient, meaning they 
have a high cost, firm i's investment level decreases thus less investment yields less 
production (See Appendix A.4 ln[138]).
Downstream firms use cost reducing investments to enhance their output levels. If 
investments  are  costly,  firms  can't  increase  their  output  through  lowering  their 
production costs. This affects sales price of firm i in two ways. First, reduced output 
makes  a  positive  effect  on price.  Second,  as  output  is  reduced,  upstream profit 
decreases and upstream firm can't spare as much resources to quality investment, 
which shifts the demand curve downward and makes a negative impact on firm i's 
sales price. The positive effect through decreased output exceeds the negative effect 
through decreased quality. As a result, p is higher for higher downstream investment 
costs (See Appendix A.4 ln[137]).
As we explore the effects of downstream investment cost on firm i's profit, we see 
there  exists  several  different  relations.  Firm  i's  profit  increases  as  cost  of 
downstream  investment m increases  when  upstream  investment  cost  is  high 
k≥7 or there isn't a significant difference in between downstream firm's quality 
efficiencies  (  i≤1.05 j  ).  If  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  between 
downstream firms'  quality efficiencies  and upstream investment  cost  is  low two 
things happen. When i is high, and k is very low and the difference between 
downstream firms' quality efficiencies is big enough, firm i's profit decreases when 
the cost of investment m increases. For other cases, firm i's profit first decreases, 
then it increases as cost of downstream investment m increases. In the following 
part, we explain the situation mathematically.
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 Derivative of  i
u with respect to m is
∂ i
u
∂m
=
7 1q2AL−432m2i jF2i7k H54m
2 R j
2S 
−712m3k 7−72m 2−216m2 i j
23
A=k −712m −772m 216m2 i
2− j
2
H=−6869m 105712m−371552m
T=2401−18m387112m−18833336m
L=k 27−72m27−12m249−216m 
F=10849−204mm2i
310849−204mm2i
2 j
R=−49204m
S= jk T108m
2 R  j (3.16)
and this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of  (See Appendix 
A.4 ln[139]).
L−432m2 i jF2i7k H54m
2 R j
2 (3.17)
1- The result of this equation is always negative when  k≥7 or  i≤1.05 j  
(See Appendix A.4 ln[140] and ln[141]).
2- For different values of  
i
 j
,  there are specific  k ı (k'<3) and  k ıı (k''<7) 
values.   For  any  k ı ,  result  of  equation  is  negative  when  kk ı .  If 
k ııkk ı , the result of equation is negative for lower values of m, and positive 
for higher values of m. If  kk ıı , the result of the equation is always positive. 
k '  exists  only if  i0.67 (  k>1,  m>1,  q>0 and  1i j )  Table  (3.1) 
shows k ' and k ıı values for different sets of 
i
 j
ratio.
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Table 3.1: Table shows k ı and k ıı values for various i and  j combinations.
i  j k ı k ıı
0.8 0.1 1.42 3.85
0.8 0.2 1.38 3.68
0.99 0.6 1.62 3.93
0.9 0.3 1.68 4.44
0.79 0.2 1.34 3.57
0.99 0.01 2.16 5.96
Figures (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) show  j
um  functions for different situations: 
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Figure 3.9: Change of firm i's profit by m
k = 1.30, q = 1, i=0.9 i=0.3 kk ı
 
2 3 4 5
m
0.1325
0.1330
0.1335
0.1340
i
U
i
U m
Figure 3.10: Change of firm i's profit by m
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Figure 3.11: Change of firm i's profit by m
k = 6, q = 1, i=0.9 i=0.3 kk ıı
Firm i is dominant firm in the market as a result of its high product quality. Firm i is 
in best situation when its quality efficiency is very high compared to its rival, and 
upstream quality investment is very high. In this case, firm i's investment level is 
very high and firm j's investment level is very low, thus any increase in downstream 
investment cost makes firm i worse off. 
When upstream quality investment is low or downstream firms quality efficiencies 
are close, both downstream firms' sales prices, output levels thus profits have close 
values.  In  this  case,  both  firms  make  similar  levels  of  investment.  After  the 
investment,  both firms' output level increases which reduces the total  price.  The 
increase in own output is less than the decrease in price since price is affected by 
both firms' output. As a result, firm i's profit decreases. It is not wrong to say that 
making investment is not profitable in this scenario. Yet, making investment is best 
response for firm i  because in the case where firm i  does not invest and firm j 
invests, firm i becomes worse off. To sum up, if both firms have similar output 
levels, an increase in investment cost increases firm i's profit because it reduces 
investment level, which is not profitable in this setting. 
For moderate levels of upstream investment and  i and  j difference, firm i 
suffers a slight profit loss due to to a slight increase in investment cost. Yet for 
higher  values  of  m,  firm  i's  profit  increases  as  investment  cost  increases.  The 
decrease in profit is caused by loss of advantage against firm j, and the increase is 
caused by reduced inefficient investment. 
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When we explore m effects on firm j, it  is best to start explaining the effect of 
downstream investment cost on firm j's investment level since investment level is 
directly affected by investment cost. 
Firm j's investment level decreases as cost of downstream investment m increases 
when  upstream  investment  level  is  k≥2 or  downstream  firms'  quality 
efficiencies  are  similar  ( i≤1.5 j ).  When  k2 and  i1.5 j ,  firm j's 
investment  level  increases  slightly  and  then  decreases  as  cost  of  downstream 
investment level increases. 
 Derivative of n j
u with respect to m is 
∂n i
u
∂m
=
−T AL−H−648m3  j
3 j V−9mi 7k −78m −736m72m
2 j
2 
7−12m 2k 7−72m 2−216m2 i j 
2

2

A=k 27−12m27−72m2
H=−648m3i
3−648m3i
2 j
T=504 1q
L=12mi j
V=k 3433m−112724m 49180 (3.18)
and this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of (See Appendix 
A.4 ln[152]):
AL−H−648m3 j
3 j V−9mi7k −78m −736m 72m
2 j
2
(3.19)
1- The result of this equation is always negative when k≥2 or i≤1.5 j  (See 
Appendix A.4 ln[153] and [154]).
2- When  k2 and  i1.5 j ,  the result  of equation is positive for smaller 
values  of  m and  negative  for  greater  values  of  m.  When  m≥2 the  result  of 
equation is always negative ( k>1, m>1, q>0 and 1i j ).
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Figures (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) show how n j
um function behaves in different 
situations. 
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Figure 3.12: Change of firm j's investment level by m
k = 1.02, q = 1, i=0.95 i=0.1
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Figure 3.13: Change of firm j's investment level by m
k = 3, q = 1, i=0.95 i=0.1
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Figure 3.14: Change of firm j's investment level by m
k = 1.02, q = 1, i=0.95 i=0.6
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Both  downstream firms  suffer  from an increase  in  downstream investment  cost 
since it makes R&D more expensive and reduces firms' investment level. However, 
in the case where upstream investment is very high, there is a significant difference 
in downstream firms' quality efficiencies and downstream investment cost is low, 
firm j benefits from an increase in investment cost. This is because, high quality 
investment combined with great difference between i and  j , causes firm j 
to serve only a small portion of the market. Thus, firm i makes more investment in 
cost reduction compared to firm j, to improve its advantage further. Therefore, an 
increase in investment cost cancels this advantage of firm i. However, if investment 
becomes more expensive, firm j's investment level again decreases due to lack of 
own cost reducing investment. 
When we examine the effect of downstream investment cost on firm j's output, we 
encounter a set of relations that are given below.
Firm j's  output  level  decreases  as  cost  of  downstream investment m increases 
when  upstream  investment  cost  is  high  ( k≥10 )  or  there  isn't  a  significant 
difference in between downstream firm's quality efficiencies (  i≤1.07 j  ). If 
there is a significant difference in between downstream firms' quality efficiencies (
i1.07 j ) and upstream investment cost is low ( k10 ) ,  following two 
things happen. When i is high, and k is very low and the difference between 
downstream firms' quality efficiencies is big enough, firm j's output level increases 
when the cost of investment  m increases. For other cases, firm j's output level 
first increases, then it decreases as cost of downstream investment  m increases. 
The mathematical explanation is given below.
 Derivative of X i
u with respect to m is
∂ X i
u
∂m
=
−T ALH−98k 1−6m 2 j108m
2 j
3i k 4972m −1447m 
7−12m2 k 7−72m 2−216m2i j
2

2

A=k 27−12m27−72m2
H=−108m2i
3−108m2i
2 j108m
2 j
2
T=84 1q
39
L=432m 2i j (3.20)
and this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of  (See Appendix 
A.4 ln[146]):
k 27−72m 
2
−7−12m 
2
−L H−98k 1−6m
2  j108m
2 j
3
i k 4972m −1447m
(3.21)
1- The result of this equation is always negative when  k≥10 or  i≤1.07 j  
(See Appendix A.4 ln[147] and [148]).
2- For different values of  
i
 j
, there are specific  k ı (k'<2) and  k ıı (k''<10) 
values.  For any k ı , result of equation is positive when kk ı . If k ııkk ı
, the result of equation is positive for lower values of m, and negative for higher 
values of m. If kk ıı , the result of the equation is always negative.  k ı  only 
exists if  i0.73 ( k>1, m>1, q>0 and  1i j ). Table (3.2) shows  k '
and k ıı values for different sets of 
i
 j
ratio.
Table 3.2: Table shows k ı and k ıı values for various i and  j combinations.
i  j k ı k ıı
0.8 0.1 1.2 6.2
0.8 0.2 1.12 5.87
0.99 0.6 1.07 5.93
0.9 0.3 1.33 7.03
0.79 0.2 1.09 5.72
0.99 0.01 1.88 9.67
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Figures (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) show how X j
um  function behaves in different 
situations: 
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Figure 3.15: Change of firm j's output level by m
k = 8, q = 1, i=0.9 i=0.3 kk ıı
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Figure 3.16: Change of firm j's output level by m
k = 3, q = 1, i=0.9 i=0.3 k ııkk ı
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Figure 3.17: Change of firm j's output level by m
k = 1.2, q = 1, i=0.9 i=0.3 k ıık ı
An increase in downstream investment cost affects  firm j's output level in three 
ways,  depending  on  the  upstream  investment  cost  and  the  difference  between 
downstream quality efficiencies. If upstream investment is very low, due to a high 
investment  cost,  the  difference  in  downstream  firm's  quality  efficiencies  is 
neglected regardless of how big it is. Firm i's output level is still more than that of 
firm  j,  yet  there  isn't  much  difference  between  them.  In  this  case,  increased 
downstream investment cost decreases investment level of firm j, causing higher 
production cost thus a negative effect on its output level. This also happens in the 
case where downstream firm's quality efficiencies have very close values because 
downstream firms' output levels are again similar. 
If  upstream  investment  cost  is  low,  which  means  upstream  firms  makes  more 
investment in quality, the separation in downstream firms' output level increases. If 
there is significant difference in quality efficiency values of downstream firms, firm 
j serves to a very low portion of the market. In this case, firm i uses cost reducing 
investments as a tool to enhance its superiority., where as firm j's investment level is 
very low because  of  low profit.  If  the  cost  of  investment  is  high,  firm i's  tool  
becomes expensive, which makes firm j better off and its output level is positively 
affected. 
In cases where neither upstream investment is too high, nor the difference between 
downstream firms quality efficiencies is too much, firm j is negatively affected by 
rivals cost reducing investment, but also, it has resources to invest in its own cost 
reduction. In this situation, a slight increase in investment cost is beneficial for firm 
j, as it affects firm i more than firm j. But if the cost of investment increases too 
42
much, firm j's output level decreases since it becomes more expensive to make any 
investment and reduce production cost. 
Downstream firms use cost reducing investments to enhance their output levels. If 
investments  are  costly,  firms  can't  increase  their  output  through  lowering  their 
production costs. This affects sales price of firm j in two ways. First, reduced output 
makes  a  positive  effect  on price.  Second,  as  output  is  reduced,  upstream profit 
decreases and upstream firm can't spare as much resources to quality investment, 
which shifts the demand curve downward and makes a negative impact on firm j's 
sales price. The positive effect through decreased output exceeds the negative effect 
through  decreased  quality.  As  a  result,  firm j's  sales  price  is  higher  for  higher 
downstream investment costs (See Appendix A.4 ln[145]).
Firm i can make more investment compared to firm j in every possible case. When 
firm j makes a cost reducing investment and increases its output, firm i makes more 
cost reducing investment and increases its own output even more. This increases 
total  output  and  decreases  sales  price.  Any  advantage  firm  j  gains  from  an 
investment is canceled because of reduced sales price. We can say that cost reducing 
investment is not profitable for firm j, yet if firm j does not invest and firm i does, 
firm j is worse off, so firm i has to invest. Therefore, an increase in downstream 
investment cost decreases inefficient downstream investment level thus increases 
profit for firm j (See Appendix A.4 ln[151]).
Lastly, we explore the effects of downstream investment cost on upstream firm. As 
we state earlier,  increased investment cost reduces firm i's  output level in every 
case. But we can't say the same thing for firm j's output level, there are some cases 
in which firm j's output level increases as downstream investment cost increases. 
We can speak of a total output reduction even for these cases (See Appendix A.4 
ln[155]) since firm i has the advantage of having higher quality efficiency and is 
always one step ahead of firm j.  Therefore,  in a  situation where firm j's output 
increases  and  firm i's  output  level  decreases,  the  decrease  of  firm i's  output  is 
always higher than the increase in firm j's output. Once it is clear that total output 
level decreases as downstream investment cost increases, we can investigates the 
effects of this on the upstream firm. First of all, obviously, upstream firm faces a 
lower demand,  due to  an increase in  m.  This  prevents  the supplier  to  choose a 
higher wholesale price. So we can say that if downstream investment cost increases, 
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upstream wholesales price decreases (See Appendix A.4 ln[156]). Lower wholesale 
price combined with a lower output, upstream firm's profit decreases as well (See 
Appendix A.4 ln[157]). As upstream firm's profit decreases, the resources it can 
spare for quality investment decreases. As a result, upstream quality investment is 
negatively effected from a downstream investment cost increase (See Appendix A.4 
ln[158]).
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4.EXTENSION
Firm i moves first
In this section, we want to analyze the impact of a new timing of the model. Despite 
the first model, firms choose their output levels sequentially. Our purpose is to see 
the effect of a quality differentiation when firms' outputs are not identical. Inverse 
demand  functions  the  firms  faces,  and  the  profit  functions  of  upstream  and 
downstream firms are identical to the previous model. The timing of the game is as 
follows; in the first stage, upstream firm chooses its quality investment level, in the 
second stage downstream firms determine their cost reducing investment level, in 
the  third  stage  upstream  firm  chooses  its  wholesale  price,  in  the  fourth  stage 
downstream firm with higher quality efficiency chooses its output level, in the fifth 
stage firm with lower quality efficiency chooses its output level. We assume that 
there is perfect information. Figure (4.1) shows timing of the game.
 Figure 4.1: Timing of the game
Again we solve this model through backwards induction. Since first three stages are 
identical with the previous model we solve in this paper, we show the solution of 
those steps in the appendix. 
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Solution for 4th and 5th stages
In this  stage of the game,  both downstream firms determine the quantities  they 
produce. Profit functions of the firms are given in equations (2.14) and (2.15). If we 
set the first order condition of firm j's profit function equal to zero, we obtain the 
following reaction function for firm j:
∂ j
∂ X j
=1q−wn j−X i−2x j y  j=0 X j
R=
1q−wn j− xi y  j
2
(4.1)
We substitute X j
R into profit function of firm i and obtain:
 i
R=−m n2−
x i−1−qw−2n in jx i−2yi y  j
2
(4.2)
We set first order condition of equation (4.2) equal to zero, solve for x i and obtain 
the equilibrium output level of firm i:
∂ i
R
∂ X i
=1q2n i2yi−w−n j−2x i− y  j=0  
X i
S1=
1q2n i2y i−w−n j− y j
2
(4.3)
Substituting  the  equilibrium  output  of  firm  i  into  equation  (4.1),  we  obtain 
equilibrium output level of firm j:
X j
S1=
1q−2n i−2y i−w3n j3y j
4
(4.4)
(Superscript S1 indicates the equilibrium values of the fourth and fifth stage)
Second order conditions should be negative for a maximum.
∂2 i
∂ X i
2 =−20 (4.5)
∂2 j
∂ X j
2 =−20 (4.6)
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Equations  (4.5)  and (4.6)  ensure  that  profit  function  is  concave with  respect  to 
quantities  (X).  We also  have  to  check  the  stability  of  the  equilibrium.  For  the 
equilibrium to be stable and unique, the following condition should hold:

∂2 i
∂ X i
2 ∗
∂2 j
∂ X j
2 
∂2 i
∂ X i X j
∗
∂2 j
∂ X i X j

(4.7)
Left part of the inequality is equal to 4, right part of it is equal to 1, so the condition 
holds. 
As we stated earlier, the rest of the solution is in the appendix together with the 
equilibrium values of endogenous variables.  One thing that reveals itself at this 
point is that in order for firm j's output level to be non negative, there should not be 
significant  difference  among  the  downstream  firms'  quality  efficiencies. 
i≤1.16 j  is the necessary condition for firm j to have a non negative output. 
Firm i has upper hand for quality. Being a first mover gives firm i an opportunity to 
leave firm j out of the market if there is a significant quality differentiation between 
the firms.  Therefore we take  i≤1.16 j as  one of  the conditions as we used 
comparative  static  analysis  to  see  the  effects  of  endogenous  variables  (quality 
efficiencies  and  investment  costs)  on  the  endogenous  variables  (outputs,  sales 
prices, profits, downstream investment, upstream investment and wholesale price). 
Our goal in this section is to explore any changes caused by different timing of this 
model. The ones we find are as follows.
Effect of i
In the previous model, we see that firm i's quality efficiency has a conditional effect 
on firm j's sales price. We don't observe the same effect in this model, since we have 
an upper limit for quality differentiation. There is only a positive effect of firm i's 
quality efficiency on rivals  sales price (See Appendix A.5 ln[99]).  This positive 
effect occurs through three steps. As i increases, firm i's output increase, firm j's 
output decrease. Increase in firm i's output is greater than the decrease in firm j's 
output so total output increases. Increase of total output creates a negative effect on 
sales price of firm j, however it also causes upstream firm to make more quality 
investment which eventually affects sales price of firm j positively. The positive 
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effect exceeds the negative effect so firm j's sales price increases as rivals quality 
efficiency increases. 
Effect of  j
In the previous model,we observe that the effects of firm j's quality efficiency on 
rival firm are conditional. Within this model, since the quality differentiation has an 
upper limit, firm i's quality efficiency has only negative effect on firm i's output 
level, investment level and profit (See Appendix A.5 ln[109], [110] and [111]). An 
increase in  firm j's  quality efficiency increases  firm j's  output  level.  As firm j's 
output  increases,  market  share  of  firm  j  increases  thus  market  share  of  firm  i 
decreases. This reduction in firm i's output level causes firm i's profit to decrease. 
Finally, firm i has less resources to spare for cost reducing investment, as a result its 
investment level decreases. 
In this section, we analyze a situation in which firm i has the advantage to move 
first  when  downstream firms  decide  their  output  levels.  Remember  that  firm  i 
already has an advantage of having higher quality. If it also has an advantage of 
having the first movement, then firm i has the opportunity to leave firm j outside of 
market  if  quality  differentiation  is  significant.  In  the  cases  where  quality 
differentiation is not significant, we don't see conditional situations that we observe 
in our first model. 
Firm j moves first
In this section, we analyze a situation where firm j which has a lower quality, has an 
advantage of having the first move in output competition. Our goal is to see the 
effects of this timing on the model. Inverse demand functions the firms faces, and 
the profit functions of upstream and downstream firms are identical to the previous 
models.  The timing of the game is  as follows;  in  the first  stage,  upstream firm 
chooses  its  quality  investment  level,  in  the  second  stage  downstream  firms 
determine their  cost  reducing investment  level,  in  the third stage upstream firm 
chooses its wholesale price, in the fourth stage downstream firm with lower quality 
efficiency  chooses  its  output  level,  in  the  fifth  stage  firm  with  higher  quality 
efficiency chooses its  output  level.  We assume that  there is  perfect  information. 
Figure (4.2) shows timing of the game.
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Figure 4.2: Timing of the game
Again we solve this model through backwards induction. Since first three stages are 
identical with the previous model we solve in this paper, we show the solution of 
those steps in the appendix. 
Solution for 4th and 5th stages
In this  stage of the game,  both downstream firms determine the quantities  they 
produce. Profit functions of the firms are given in equations (2.15) and (2.16). If we 
set the first order condition of firm i's profit function equal to zero, we obtain the 
following reaction function for firm i:
∂ i
∂ X i
=1q−wni−x j−2xi y i=0 X i
R=
1q−wn i−x j y i
2
(4.8)
We substitute X j
R into profit function of firm i and obtain:
 j
R=−m n2−
x j −1−qw−2n jnix j−2y  j y i
2
(4.9)
We set  first  order  condition  of  equation  (4.9)  equal  to  zero,  solve  for x j and 
obtain the equilibrium output level of firm i:
∂ j
R
∂ X j
=1q2n j2y j−w−ni−2x j− y i=0  
X j
S2=
1q2n j2y  j−w−ni− y i
2
(4.10)
Substituting  the  equilibrium  output  of  firm  i  into  equation  (4.8),  we  obtain 
equilibrium output level of firm i:
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Upstream 
firm chooses 
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Downstream 
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investment levels 
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1st stage
Upstream 
frm chooses 
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Efficient 
firm chooses 
its output 
level x i .
Inefficient 
firm chooses 
its output 
level x j .
5th stage
X i
S2=
1q−2n j−2y  j−w3n i3yi
4 (4.11)
(Superscript S2 indicates the equilibrium values of the fourth and fifth stage)
We  have  to  check  for  second  order  conditions  to  make  sure  profit  function  is 
concave with respect to quantities. Second order conditions should be negative for a 
maximum.
∂2 i
∂ X i
2 =−20 (4.12)
∂2 j
∂ X j
2 =−20 (4.13)
Equations (4.12) and (4.13) ensure that profit function is concave with respect to 
quantities  (X).  We also  have  to  check  the  stability  of  the  equilibrium.  For  the 
equilibrium to be stable and unique, the following condition should hold:

2i
 X i
2 ∗
2 j
 X j
2 
2i
 X i X j
∗
2 j
 X i X j
 (4.14)
Left part of the inequality is equal to 4, right part of it is equal to 1, so the condition 
holds. As we stated earlier, the rest of the solution is in the appendix together with 
the equilibrium values of endogenous variables. After solving the model, we make a 
comparative static analysis to see the effects of exogenous variables on endogenous 
variables. Our goal is to see the consequences of a different timing. Our findings are 
as follows
Effects of i
On the original model, we observe that the effects of firm i's quality efficiency on 
firm j's sales price are conditional. We observe a similar case here, yet with different 
conditions. Here we make the following preposition:
Proposition 1.7:  If  i  and   j  are sufficiently close, inefficient firm's sales 
price increases as the quality efficiency level of rival firm increases. 
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Proof: Derivative of P j
u with respect to i is:
∂ P j
u
∂i
=
−A −768 5−6m2 m2i
2 j−48m −56mi H − j C192 17−24m 
2 m2 j
2

k 856m163192m 2192m2 −1724m  j2−56mi 
2

2
 A=3456m2−34m−56m1q
H=k 856m−163192m1617−24mm j
2
C=k 856m −9596m856m −163192m (4.15)
The sign of equation (5.8) is determined by the following equation (See Appendix 
A.6 ln[96]):
 j C192m
245−6m2i
217−24m 2 j
2−48m −56m iH  (4.16)
The result of equation (4.16) is positive when i≤1.8 j and it is negative when 
i≥2.4 j while k>1, m>1, q>0 and  1i j  (See Appendix A.6 ln[97] 
and [98]).
Figure (4.3) shows that P j
ui function is concave. Firm j's sales price increases 
for  an increase in lower values  of  i and decreases for an increase in  higher 
values of i .
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Figure 4.3: Change of firm j's sales price by i
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.4
Our reasoning for the relation between firm i's quality efficiency and firm j's sales 
price in the original model applies this model as well. An increase in firm i's quality 
efficiency increases  total  output,  and  eventually  causes  an  increase  in  upstream 
firm's  quality  investment.  The  positive  effect  of  quality  increase  exceeds  the 
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negative effect  of output  increase there isn't  a  significant  quality differentiation. 
This model allows a larger quality differentiation compared to the original model, 
since firm j having the advantage of being first mover, produces more output, and 
an  increase  in  i has  less  effect  on total  output.  If  the  quality differentiation 
among the firms is significant, than the negative effect of output increase exceeds 
the positive effect of quality increase. 
Effects of  j
As  we  examine  the  effects  of  firm  j's  quality  efficiency,  we  see  that  it  has  a 
conditional effect on rival firm, just like it has in the original model. However, the 
conditions  are  a  little  different  due  to  the  change  in  production  levels  of 
downstream  firms.  Following  proposition  helps  us  explain  firm  j's  quality 
efficiency's effect on the rival firm's output level:
Proposition 1.8:  If  i  and   j  are sufficiently close,  efficient firm's output 
level decreases as the quality efficiency level of rival firm increases. 
Proof: Derivative of X i
u with respect to  j is:
∂ X j
u
∂ j
=
41472m3 −34m 1q7685−6m2 m2i
3
−AHi C192 17−24m
2 m2 j
2

k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m j2−56mi
2

2
 A=56k m −1724m856m −163192m j
H=768m 2−56m −1724m i
2 j
C=k 85−418m480m2856m−163192m (4.17)
The sign of equation (4.17) is determined by the following equation (See Appendix 
A.6 ln[108]):
 j C192m
225−6mi−1724m j
2−A (4.18)
The result  of equation (4.18) is  negative when and it  is  i2.3 j  positive 
when  i3  j  while  k>1,  m>1,  q>0  and  1i j (See  Appendix  A.6 
ln[109] and [110]).
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Figure  (4.4)  shows  that  X i
u j function  is  concave.  Firm  i's  output  level 
increases for an increase in lower values of   j and decreases for a increase in 
higher values of  j .
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
 j
0.251
0.252
0.253
0.254
0.255
0.256
0.257
xi
U
xi
U j
Figure 4.4: Change of firm i's output level by  j
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1, i=0.8
Our explanations of relations in the original model applies here. Firm j's quality 
efficiency affects firm i's output level through a direct and an indirect effect. If firm 
j's  quality  efficiency  increases,  its  output  and  market  share  increases  which 
automatically causes a reduction in firm i's output. However as we discuss earlier, 
an increase in quality efficiency causes an increase in total output, which allows 
upstream firm to make more quality investment. Increased quality favors firm i and 
enables  it  to  increase  its  output  level.  When  there  is  a  significant  quality 
differentiation,  the  positive  effect  exceeds  the  negative  effect.  If  quality 
differentiation is not much, then the negative effect exceeds positive effect and as a 
result firm i's output level decreases. 
We discuss in the original model that the effects of k on output level, profit and 
investment level are the same. Here, we can say the same thing about the effects of 
 j on firm i's output level, profit and investment level.
The conditions that explain how firm j's quality efficiency affects firm i's output 
level are exactly the same as the conditions that explain firm j's quality efficiency's 
effects on firm i's profit and investment level. 
Signs  of  derivatives  of  X i
u ,   i
u , n i
u with  respect  to   j depends  on  a 
condition which is same for all three derivatives. 
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∂ X j
u
∂ j
=
41472m3−34m1q 7685−6m
2
m2i
3
−AHi C192 17−24m 
2
m2 j
2

k 856m 163192m
2
192m2−1724m  j2−56mi
2

2
 A=56k m −1724m 856m −163192m j
H=768m2−56m−1724mi
2 j
C=k 85−418m480m2856m−163192m (4.17)
∂ j
u
∂ j
=
3456m3 S T 7685−6m 2 m2 i
3
−AHi C192 17−24m 
2 m2 j
2

k 856m 163192m2192m2 −1724m  j2−56mi 
2

3
 A=56k m −1724m856m −163192m j
H=768m 2−56m −1724m i
2 j
C=k 85−418m480m2856m−163192m
T=k −56m 856m −163192m 192m2i− j 2−56mi−1724m  j 
S=−34m−289576m1q 2 (4.19)
∂ n j
u
∂ j
=
S 768 5−6m2 m2i
3− AHi C192 17−24m
2 m2  j
2
k 856m163192m2192m2−1724m j2 −56mi 
2

2
 A=56k m −1724m856m −163192m j
H=768m 2−56m −1724m i
2 j
C=k 85−418m480m2856m−163192m
S=29376m2−34m1q (4.20)
The sign of equations (4.17), (4.19) and (4.20) are determined by the following 
equation (while k>1, q>0 and 1i j ), (See Appendix A.6 ln[108], [114] and 
[111]):
 j C192m
225−6mi−1724m  j
2−A (4.21)
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Equation (4.21) yields a positive result when i≥3 j  and a negative result when 
i≤2.3 j . And since it determines the signs of all three derivatives, we can say 
that quality efficiency of firm j affects firm i's output, firm i's profit and firm i's 
investment level in parallel courses. This is not contrary to intuition. If we look at 
firm i's profit function (2.14) we see that output level has a direct effect on firm i's  
profit.  Also,  investment  levels  are  affected  the  same way since  profit  creates  a 
resource  to  spare on investments.  Any change in  profit  affects  investment  level 
proportionally. 
In this version of the model, we see that firm j's quality efficiency affects firm j in  
quite an interesting way, thus we explain this in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.09:  If  i  and   j  are not sufficiently close,  inefficient firm's 
output level decreases as own quality efficiency level increases. 
Proof: Derivative of X j
u with respect to  j is:
∂ X j
u
∂ j
=
−S 768 5−6m2 m2i
3−AHi C192 17−24m
2 m2 j
2
k 856m 163192m2−192m2 −1724m j2 −56mi
2

2
A=k −1724m856m−163192m  j
H=768m 2−56m −1724m i
2 j
C=k −852m 1396m856m−163192m
S=41472m3−34m1q (4.22)
The sign of equation (4.22) is determined by the following equation (See Appendix 
A.6 ln[118]):
768m2 −56m i
2
−56m i−1724m j−A −1780m−i−C−192 17−24m
2
m2 j
2

(4.23)
The result of equation (4.23) is positive when and it i3  j  is negative when 
i10  j , while k>1, m>1, q>0 and  1i j (See Appendix A.6 ln[119] 
and [120]).
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Figure (4.5) shows X j
u j function. Function has a minimum at  j=0.10 for 
given values.  Slope is downward for lower values of  j and upward for higher 
values of  j .
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Figure 4.5: Change of firm j's output level by  j
k = 11, m = 7, q = 1, i=0.9
It is odd to see any negative effect of firm j's quality efficiency on firm j's output 
level.  However  there  is  a  simple  explanation.  As  firm  j's  quality  efficiency 
increases,  total  output  increases  which  causes  upstream  firm  to  increase  its 
investment in quality. If quality efficiency of firm i is a lot greater than that of firm 
i, then, increase in firm i's output level can be bigger than the increase in firm j's 
output  level.  Then,  firm  i's  market  share  increases  hence  firm  j's  output  level 
decreases.  If  quality differentiation  is  not  as  significant,  the  increase in  firm i's 
output level due to increased quality is less than the increase in firm j's output due 
to higher quality efficiency. In this case, firm j's output level increases as   j
increases. 
As we know that firm j's output level, profit and investment level are connected, we 
can say that the effects of firm j's quality efficiency shows parallel courses in firm 
j's output level, profit and investment level. 
The conditions that explain how firm j's quality efficiency affects firm j's output 
level are exactly the same as the conditions that explain firm j's quality efficiency's 
effects on firm j's profit and investment level. 
Signs  of  derivatives  of  X j
u ,   j
u , n j
u with  respect  to   j depends  on  a 
condition which is same for all three derivatives. 
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∂ X j
u
∂ j
=
−S 7685−6m 2 m2i
3−AHi C192 17−24m
2 m2  j
2
k 856m 163192m2−192m2 −1724m j2 −56m i
2

2
 A=k −1724m 856m−163192m  j
H=768m2−56m−1724mi
2 j
C=k −852m 1396m856m−163192m
S=41472m3−34m1q  (4.22)
∂ n j
u
∂ j
=
−T 768 5−6m2 m2 i
3−AHi C192 17−24m
2 m2 j
2
k 856m163192m2−192m2−1724m j2 −56mi
2

2
T=17280m 3−34m1q (4.24)
∂ j
u
∂ j
=
−R T 768 5−6m 
2
m2i
3
−AHi C19217−24m
2
m2  j
2

k 856m 163192m
2
−192m2 −1724m  j2−56m i 
2

3
T= k −1724m856m −163192m−384m2 i− j2 −56m i−1724m j   
R=6912m 3−34m−2572m1q2 (4.25)
The sign of equations (4.22), (4.24) and (4.25) are determined by the following 
equation (while k>1, q>0 and 1i j ), (See Appendix A.6 ln[118], [121] and 
[124]):
768m2 −56m i
2
−56mi−1724m j −A −1780m −i −C−19217−24m 
2
m2 j
2

A=k −1724m856m−163192m  j
C=k −852m 1396m856m−163192m (4.26)
Equation (4.26) yields a positive result when i≤3 j  and a negative result when 
i≥10 j .  And since it determines the signs of all three derivatives, we can say 
that quality efficiency of firm j affects firm j's output, firm j's profit and firm j's 
investment  level  in  parallel  courses.  This  means  that  if  quality  differentiation 
between the downstream firms is too great, an increase in firm j's quality efficiency 
decreases firm j's output level as we state earlier. This loss in output is directly 
transferred to profit of firm j since output is a key factor in profit function. Also, as 
the profits decrease, firm j's has less resources to invest in cost reduction. 
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Effects of k
As we investigate the effects of upstream investment cost in this new model, we see 
that the only effects of k that differ from the original model are k's effect on firm j.  
As in the original model, upstream investment cost affects firm j in different ways 
depending on the conditions. The conditions are different in this model, which are 
stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.10: Firm j's output level increases if as upstream investment cost k
increases when downstream firms' quality efficiencies are not sufficiently close (
i1.5 j ).  Firm j's output level decreases with an upstream investment cost 
increase  when  downstream  firms'  quality  efficiencies  are  sufficiently  close  (
i1.125 j ).
Proof: Derivative of X j
u with respect to k is:
∂ X j
u
∂ j
= 20736m
3−34m 856m −163−192m 1q  A
k 856m 163192m
2
−192m2−1724m  j2 −56m i
2

2
A=56mi17−80m  j2 −56mi−1724m  j (4.27)
and this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of  (See Appendix 
A.6 ln[137]):
56mi17−80m  j (4.28)
It is positive when i1.5 j  and negative when i1.25 j  while k>1, q>0 
and 1i j (See Appendix A.6 ln[138] and [139]).
Figures (4.6) and (4.7) show X j
uk  functions for two different situations.
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Figure 4.6: Change of firm j's output level by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.7 i=0.8
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Figure 4.7: Change of firm j's output level by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.5 i=0.8
The  same  reasoning  applies  here,  as  it  is  in  the  original  model.  If  quality 
differentiation among the downstream firms is not too big, quality increase affects 
them almost equally. In this case, an increase in upstream investment cost naturally 
causes a  reduction in firm j's output level.  However,  if  quality differentiation is 
significant, then quality increase favors firm i, and harms firm j. In this case, an 
increase in upstream investment cost increases firm j's output level. Also, just like in 
the original model, the effect of upstream investment cost on firm j's production is 
parallel to the effects on firm j's profit and investment levels.
The impact of upstream investment cost on firm j's sales price is conditional as it is 
in the original model. The conditions for this model are different than that of the 
original model, thus they are stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1.11: Firm j's sales price increases if as upstream investment cost k
increases when downstream firms' quality efficiencies are significantly different (
i8 j ).   Firm  j's  sales  price  decreases  with  an  upstream  investment  cost 
increase when downstream firms' quality efficiencies are not significantly different (
i≤5.5 j ).
Proof: Derivative of P j
u with respect to k is:
∂ P j
u
∂ k
=
A 2−56m i−1724m  j 24m −56m i−8518 43−48m m j
k 856m 163192m2−192m2−1724m j2−56m i
2

2
A=1728m 2−34m856m −163192m1q (4.29)
and this equation is negative or positive depending on the sign of  (See Appendix 
A.6 ln[146]):
30mi71−6m  j (4.30)
It is positive when i≥8 j  and negative when i≤5.5 j  while k>1, q>0 and 
1i j  (See Appendix A.6 ln[147] and [148]).
Figures (4.8) and (4.9) show P j
uk  functions for two different situations.
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Figure 4.8: Change of firm j's sales price by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.5 i=0.8
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Figure 4.9: Change of firm j's sales price by k
m = 7, q = 1,  j=0.09 i=0.8
Upstream firm's investment decreases when it faces a high investment cost. This 
reduction on quality investment affects downstream firms sales price in two ways. 
First,  as quality decreases,  downstream firms'  demands curves shift  downwards, 
which directly affects the sales price negatively. Secondly, reduced demand causes 
downstream manufacturers  to  produce less output,  which indirectly affects  sales 
price positively. For firm i, the negative effect always exceeds the positive effect, 
since firm i has a high quality. For firm j, however, the magnitude of these effects 
are conditional. If the quality differentiation among the firms is not significant, then 
the  effect  on  firm j  is  similar  to  the  effect  on  firm i.  However,  if  the  quality 
differentiation is quite big, then, the positive effect is higher for firm j. It can be 
explained as follows. In order for quality differentiation to be big, firm i has to have 
a  high  quality  efficiency,  and  firm  j  has  to  have  a  low  quality  efficiency.  An 
decrease in upstream investment level due to high investment cost, affects firm i a 
lot and increases the loss of total output. However, the negative effect on firm j's 
price is very little since firm j's has a low quality efficiency. 
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6. CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the effects of a quality differentiation of 
two manufacturers due to an upstream supplier quality investment. To achieve our 
goal, we construct a model of a supply chain that includes an upstream firm and two 
downstream firms. We use a coefficient we call quality efficiency of downstream 
firms to create a quality differentiation. This coefficient is a multiplier of upstream 
quality  investment  and  it  determines  the  percentage  of  upstream  quality  level 
transferred to the consumers. The model is a four stage game where upstream firm 
chooses quality investment level and wholesale price, and downstream firms choose 
their output levels and cost reducing investment levels. We solve the model through 
backwards induction method. Once we find the equilibrium values of endogenous 
variables, we make a comparative static analysis to see the effects of exogenous 
variables on endogenous variables. As we explore our model, we see that that the 
degree of quality differentiation plays an important role in determining firm j's (firm 
having lower quality) quality's effect on firm i (firm having high quality). We also 
see that, investment costs' effect on the firm with low quality also depends on the 
degree of quality differentiation. 
As an extension, we investigate the effects of a different timing on our model. We 
let  one of  the  downstream firms to  make the  first  move when choosing output 
levels. Here, we see that if the firm that makes the first move is the firm with high 
quality, it has the opportunity to leave the rival firm out of market when quality 
differentiation is significant. 
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APPENDIX A.1
Equilibrium outcomes of first model
Upstream investment level:
yu=
−432m21q i j
−k 7−72m2216m2i j
2 (A.1.1)
Upstream wholesale price:
wu= 36km−772m1q
k 7−72m 2−216m2 i j
2 (A.1.2)
Upstream profit:
u
u= 864km
21q2
k 7−72m2−216m2i j
2
(A.1.3)
Firm i's output level:
X i
u=
12m1qk −712m−772m 216m2i
2− j
2
−712mk 7−72m2−216m 2i j
2
(A.1.4)
Firm j's output level:
X j
u=
12m1qk −712m−772m 216m2−i
2 j
2
−712m k 7−72m2−216m 2i j
2
(A.1.5)
Firm i's sales price:
P i
u=
1q k −748m−772m216m 2i
2− j
2
k 7−72m2−216m 2i j
2 (A.1.6)
Firm j's sales price:
P j
u=
1q k −748m −772m216m 2−i
2 j
2
k 7−72m2−216m2 i j
2 (A.1.7)
Firm i's profit:
 i
u=
m−49144m1q 2 k 49−588m864m 2216m2i
2−216m2 j
22
7−12m2−k 7−72m2216m2i
2432m2i j216m
2 j
22
(A.1.8)
Firm j's profit:
 j
u=
m−49144m1q 2 k 49−588m864m 2−216m2i
2216m2 j
22
7−12m2−k 7−72m2216m2i
2432m2i j216m
2 j
22
(A.1.9)
Firm i's investment level:
n i
u=
71qk 49−588m864m2216m 2i
2−216m 2 j
2
−712mk 7−72m2−216m2i
2−432m2i j−216m
2 j
2
(A.1.10)
Firm j's investment level:
n j
u=
71qk 49−588m864m2−216m 2i
2216m 2 j
2
−712mk 7−72m2−216m2i
2−432m2i j−216m
2 j
2
(A.1.11)
APPENDIX A.2
Solution and equilibrium outcomes of the second model:
3rd Stage
In this stage of the game, upstream firm determines its wholesale price.  Profit 
function  of  the  upstream firm is  given  in  equation  (2.13).   Substituting  the 
equilibrium  outputs  in  equations  (4.3)  and  (4.4)  into  profit  function  of  the 
upstream firm, we obtain:
u
S1=1
4
3w3qw−3w2−4ky22w niw n j2w yiw y  j
(A.2.1)
Setting first order conditions equal to zero and solving for wholesale price, gives 
us the wholesale price which maximizes the upstream profit.  
∂u
c
∂w
=1
4
33q−6w2n in j2y i y  j=0
ww=1
6
33q2n in j2y i y  j (A.2.2)
 Second order condition should be negative for a maximum.
∂2u
c
∂w2
=− 3
2
0 (A.2.3)
Equation (A.2.3) shows us that second order condition is satisfied.
2nd Stage
In the second stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose their cost reducing 
investment  levels  to  maximize  their  profit.   We  substitute  the  equilibrium 
wholesale price and equilibrium quantities into the profit functions and obtain:
 i
w
=
1
288
4 25−72m ni
220n i 33q−7n j10yi−7y j 33q−7n j
210y i−7y j
2

(A.2.4)
 j
w=
196n i
2289−576m n j
234n j−28n iA A−476n i n j
576
(A.2.5)
A=33q−14yi17y  j
Differentiating   i
w with  respect  to  n i ,  and   j
w with  respect  to n j , 
setting  them  equal  to  zero  and  solving  for  n i and n j ,  we  obtain  the 
following investment reaction functions:
n i=
533q−7n j10yi−7y j
2−2572m
(A.2.6)
n j=
1733q−14n i−14y i17y j
−289576m
(A.2.7)
Solving equations  (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) simultaneously,  equilibrium investment 
levels can be found as follows:
n i
d=
5−1724m−17q24mq−17yi80 m y i−56m y  j
85−978m1152m 2
(A.2.8)
n j
d=
17−56m−5q6mq−28m yi−5y j34m y  j
85−978m1152m 2
(A.2.9)
We have to check for second order conditions to make sure profit function is 
concave  with  respect  to  cost  reducing  investment  levels.    Second  order 
conditions should be negative for a maximum
∂2 i
w
∂ ni
2 =
25
36
−2m0 (A.2.10)
∂2 j
w
∂ n j
2 =
289
288
−2m0 (A.2.11)
Since  m>1,  second  order  conditions  are  satisfied.   Equations  (A.2.10)  and 
(A.2.11)  ensure  that  profit  function  is  concave with  respect  to  cost  reducing 
investment levels (n).  We also have to check the stability of the equilibrium. 
For the equilibrium to be stable and unique, the following condition should hold:

∂2 i
w
∂ ni
2 ∗
∂2 j
w
∂ n j
2 
∂2 i
w
∂ ni n j
∗
∂2 j
w
∂ ni n j
 (A.2.12)
First part of the inequality yields a result that is bigger than 1 given the condition 
that  m>1.   Right part  of the inequality is  equalt  to  
4165
10368 .  The stability 
condition is satisfied.  
1st Stage
In this stage, the upstream firm chooses its quality investment level.  Substituting 
the  equilibrium  outputs,  equilibrium  wholesale  price  and  equilibrium 
downstream investment levels into the profit function of the upstream firm, we 
obtain:
u
d=
192m29 −34m1q−1724m y i2−56m y j
2
846m−163192m2
(A.2.13)
Upstream firm maximizes its profit with respect to quality investment level (y), 
so:
∂u
d
∂ y
=
−2 k 856m−163192m 2 y−192m2 −1724mi2−56m j A
846m−163192m 2
=0
A=9 −34m1q−1724m y i2−56m y j (A.2.14)
If we solve for y we obtain:
yu=
−1728m2 −34m 1q−1724m i2−56m j
−k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m i2 −56m j
2
(A.2.15)
Second order conditions should be negative for a maximum.
∂2u
d
∂ y 2
=
−k 856m 163192m2192m2 −1724m i2 −56m  j 
2
846m −163192m2
0
(A.2.16)
Equation (A.2.16) is always smaller than zero when m>1, k>1, and 1i j
, so second order condition is satisfied.
Equilibrium Values
Upstream investment level:
yu=
−1728m2 −34m 1q−1724m i2−56m j
−k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m i2 −56m j
2
(A.2.17)
Upstream wholesale price:
wu= 144k m−34m856m−163−192m1q
k 856m 163192m2192m2 −1724m i2−56m j
2
(A.2.18)
Upstream profit:
u
u= 15552k 3−4m
2 m21q 2
k 856m163192m2192m2−1724m i2−56m  j
2
(A.2.19)
Firm i's output level:
X i
u= 121qk m−1724m856m−163192m384m
3 A
k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m i2 −56m j
2
A=i− j−1724m i2 −56m j
(A.2.20)
Firm j's output level:
X j
u= 24m 1qk −56m856m−163192m−192m
2 A
k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m i2 −56m j
2
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j
(A.2.21)
Firm i's sales price:
P i
u=1q k 85−654m720m
2856m −163192m 384m2−56m A
k 856m 163192m 2192m2 −1724mi2 −56m  j 
2
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j (A.2.22)
Firm j's sales price:
P j
u=1q  k 85−654m720m
2856m −163192m −192m2 −1724m A
k 856m 163192m2192m2 −1724mi2 −56m  j
2  
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j (A.2.23)
Firm i's profit:
 i
u
=
m −2572m 1q 2 k −1724m856m −163192m384m2 A
k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724mi2−56m  j
2

2
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j (A.2.24)
Firm j's profit:
 j
u
=
m−289576m 1q2k −56m856m −163192m−192m2 A
k 856m163192m2192m2 −1724mi2−56m j
2

2
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j (A.2.25)
Firm i's investment level:
n i
u= 51qk −1724m 856m−163192m384m
2 A
k 856m163192m2192m2−1724m i2−56m  j
2
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j (A.2.26)
Firm j's investment level:
n j
u= 171qk −56m856m−163192m−192m
2 A
k 856m163192m2192m2−1724m i2−56m  j
2
A=i− j−1724mi2−56m j (A.2.27)
APPENDIX A. 3
Solution and equilibrium outcomes of the third model
3rd Stage
In this  stage of the game,  upstream firm determines  its  wholesale  price.   Profit 
function  of  the  upstream  firm  is  given  in  equation  (2.13).   Substituting  the 
equilibrium  outputs  in  equations  (4.10)  and  (4.11)  into  profit  function  of  the 
upstream firm, we obtain:
u
S2=1
4
3w3qw−3w2−4ky22w n jw ni2w y  jw yi (A.3.1)
Setting first order conditions equal to zero and solving for wholesale price, gives us 
the wholesale price which maximizes the upstream profit.  
∂u
S2
∂w
=1
4
33q−6w2n jni2y j y i=0
ww=1
6
33q2n jni2y  j y i (A.3.2)
Second order conditions should be negative for a maximum:
∂2u
S2
∂w2
=− 3
2
0 (A.3.3)
Equation (A.3.3) shows us that second order condition is satisfied.
2nd Stage
In the second stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose their cost reducing 
investment levels to maximize their profit.  We substitute the equilibrium wholesale 
price and equilibrium quantities into the profit functions and obtain:
 i
w=
289−576mn i
234n i−14n jAA−14n j
2
576
A=33q17y i−14y  j (A.3.4)
 j
w=
49ni
24 25−72mn j
220n¿2B B
2−14n iB10n j
288
B=33q−7yi10y j (A.3.5)
Differentiating  i
w with respect to n i , and  j
w with respect to n j , setting 
them  equal  to  zero  and  solving  for  n i and n j ,  we  obtain  the  following 
investment reaction functions:
n i=
1733q−14n j−14y  j17yi
−289576m 
(A.3.6)
n j=
533q−7n i10y j−7yi
2−2572m 
(A.3.7)
Solving equations (A.3.6) and (A.3.7) simultaneously, equilibrium investment levels 
can be found as follows:
n i
d=
17−56m−5q6mq−28m y j−5y i34m y i
85−978m1152m 2
(A.3.8)
n j
d=
5−1724m−17q24mq−17y  j80 m y  j−56m y i
85−978m1152m 2
(A.3.9)
We have  to  check  for  second  order  conditions  to  make  sure  profit  function  is 
concave with respect to cost reducing investment levels.  Second order conditions 
should be negative for a maximum:
∂2 i
w
∂ ni
2 =
289
288
−2m0 (A.3.10)
∂2 j
w
∂ n j
2 =
25
36
−2m0 (A.3.11)
Since m>1, second order conditions are satisfied.  Equations (A.3.10) and (A.3.11) 
ensure that profit function is concave with respect to cost reducing investment levels 
(n).  We also have to check the stability of the equilibrium.  For the equilibrium to 
be stable and unique, the following condition should hold:

∂2 i
w
∂ ni
2 ∗
∂2 j
w
∂ n j
2 
∂2 i
w
∂ ni n j
∗
∂2 j
w
∂ ni n j
 (A.3.12)
First part of the inequality yields a result that is bigger than 1 given the condition 
that  m>1.   Right  part  of  the  inequality  is  equalt  to  
4165
10368 .   The  stability 
condition is satisfied.  
1st Stage
In this stage, the upstream firm chooses its quality investment level.  Substituting 
the equilibrium outputs, equilibrium wholesale price and equilibrium downstream 
investment levels into the profit function of the upstream firm, we obtain:
u
d=
192m29 −34m1q−1724m y  j2−56m y i
2
846m−163192m2
(A.3.13)
Upstream firm maximizes its profit with respect to quality investment level (y), so:
∂u
d
∂ y
=
k 856m −163192m2−192m2 2−56mi−1724m  j A
846m−163192m2
=0
A=9 −34m1q2 −56m y i−1724m y j (A.3.14)
If we solve for y we obtain:
yu=
−1728m2 −34m 1q−1724m  j2 −56mi
−k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
(A.3.15)
Second order conditions should be negative for a maximum:
∂2u
d
∂ y2
=
−k 856m163192m2192m2−1724m j2−56m i
2
846m −163192m2
0
(A.3.16)
Equation (A.3.16) is always smaller than zero when m>1, k>1, and 1i j , so 
second order condition is satisfied.
Equilibrium Outcomes
Upstream investment level:
yu=
−1728m2 −34m 1q−1724m  j2 −56mi
−k 856m 163192m2192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
(A.3.17)
Upstream wholesale price:
wu= 144k m−34m856m−163−192m1q
k 856m163192m 2−192m2 −1724m  j2−56mi 
2
(A.3.18)
Upstream profit:
u
u= 15552k 3−4m
2 m21q 2
k 856m163192m2−192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
(A.3.19)
Firm i's output level:
X i
u= 24m 1qk −56m856m−163192m192m
2 A
k 856m 163192m2−192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.20)
Firm j's output level:
X j
u= 121qk m−1724m856m−163192m−384m
3 A
k 856m 163192m2−192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.21)
Firm i's sales price:
Pi
u=
1q k 85−654m720m2 856m −163192m−192m2 −1724m  A
k 856m163192m 2192m2−1724m  j2 −56mi 
2
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.22)
Firm j's sales price:
P j
u=
1q k 85−654m720m2 856m −163192m−384m2 −56m  A
k 856m 163192m2−192m2 −1724m j2 −56mi 
2
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.23)
Firm i's profit:
 i
u=m−289576m1q
2k −56m856m−163192m192m2 A
k 856m 163192m2−192m2−1724m j2 −56mi
22
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.24)
Firm j's profit:
 j
u=m−2572m1q
2k −1724m856m −163192m−384m 2 A
k 856m 163192m2−192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
22
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.25)
Firm i's investment level:
n i
u= 171qk −56m856m−163192m192m
2 A
k 856m163192m2−192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.26)
Firm j's investment level:
n j
u= 51qk −1724m856m−163192m−384m
2 A
k 856m163192m2−192m2−1724m  j2−56m i
2
A=i− j−1724m j2 −56mi (A.3.27)
APPENDIX A .4
In[1]:= Remove@"Global‘*"D
Remove::rmnsm :  There are no symbols matching "Global`*". 
In[2]:= Text@inverse demand for quality differentiated productsD;
Solve@x1 + x2 == 1 - Hp1 - y Β1L + q, p1D;
In[4]:= Solve@x1 + x2 == 1 - Hp2 - y Β2L + q, p2D;
In[5]:= p1 = 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β1;
p2 = 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β2;
In[7]:= P1 = x1 *Hp1 - w + n1L - m n1^2;
In[8]:= P2 = x2 *Hp2 - w + n2L - m n2^2;
In[9]:= Pup = Hx1 + x2L*w - k HyL^2;
In[10]:=
Text@STAGE 4D;
In[11]:= Solve@8D@P1, x1D  0, D@P2, x2D  0<, 8x1, x2<D
Out[11]= ::x1 ®
1
3
H1 + q - w + 2 n1 - n2 + 2 y Β1 - y Β2L,
x2 ®
1
3
H1 + q - w - n1 + 2 n2 - y Β1 + 2 y Β2L>>
In[12]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[13]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P1, x1D, x1D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[13]= True
In[14]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P2, x2D, x2D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[14]= True
In[15]:= Text@stability conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@P1, x1D, x1D*D@D@P2, x2D, x2D >
D@D@P1, x1D, x2D*D@D@P2, x1D, x2D, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[16]= True
In[17]:=
Text@STAGE 4 RESULTSD;
In[18]:= X1 c =
1
3
H1 + q - w + 2 n1 - n2 + 2 y Β1 - y Β2L;
X2 c =
1
3
H1 + q - w - n1 + 2 n2 - y Β1 + 2 y Β2L;
In[20]:= Simplify@P1 c = p1 . x1 ® X1 c . x2 ® X2 cD;
Simplify@P2 c = p2 . x1 ® X1 c . x2 ® X2 cD;
In[22]:= Simplify@P1 c = P1 . p1 ® P1 c . x1 ® X1 c . x2 ® X2 cD;
Simplify@P2 c = P2 . p2 ® P2 c . x1 ® X1 c . x2 ® X2 cD;
SimplifyAPuc = Pup . x1 ® X1 c . x2 ® X2 cE;
In[25]:=
Text@STAGE 3D;
In[26]:= Simplify@Solve@D@Puc, wD  0, wDD
Out[26]= ::w ®
1
4
H2 + 2 q + n1 + n2 + y Β1 + y Β2L>>
In[27]:= Text@second order conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@Puc, wD, wD £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[28]= True
In[29]:=
Text@STAGE 3 RESULTSD;
In[30]:= ww =
1
4
H2 + 2 q + n1 + n2 + y Β1 + y Β2L;
In[31]:= Simplify@X1 w = X1 c . w ® wwD;
Simplify@X2 w = X2 c . w ® wwD;
In[33]:= Simplify@P1 w = P1 c . X1 c ® X1 w . X2 c ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
Simplify@P2 w = P2 c . X1 c ® X1 w . X2 c ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
In[35]:= Simplify@P1 w = P1 c . P1 c ® P1 w . X1 c ® X1 w . X2 c ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
Simplify@P2 w = P2 c . P2 c ® P2 w . X1 c ® X1 w . X2 c ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
FullSimplify@Puw = Puc . X1 c ® X1 w . X2 c ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
In[38]:=
Text@STAGE 2D;
In[39]:= Solve@8D@P1 w, n1D  0, D@P2 w, n2D  0<, 8n1, n2<D
Out[39]= ::n1 ®
7 H-7 + 12 m - 7 q + 12 m q - 7 y Β1 + 42 m y Β1 - 30 m y Β2L
49 - 588 m + 864 m2
,
n2 ®
7 H-7 + 12 m - 7 q + 12 m q - 30 m y Β1 - 7 y Β2 + 42 m y Β2L
49 - 588 m + 864 m2
>>
In[40]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[41]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P1 w, n1D, n1D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[41]= True
In[42]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P2 w, n2D, n2D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[42]= True
In[43]:= Text@stability conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@P1 w, n1D, n1D*D@D@P2 w, n2D, n2D >
D@D@P1 w, n1D, n2D*D@D@P2 w, n1D, n2D, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[44]= True
In[45]:=
Text@STAGE 2 RESULTSD;
In[46]:= n1 d =
7 H-7 + 12 m - 7 q + 12 m q - 7 y Β1 + 42 m y Β1 - 30 m y Β2L
49 - 588 m + 864 m2
;
n2 d =
7 H-7 + 12 m - 7 q + 12 m q - 30 m y Β1 - 7 y Β2 + 42 m y Β2L
49 - 588 m + 864 m2
;
In[48]:= Simplify@X1 d = X1 w . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@X2 d = X2 w . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@wd = ww . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[51]:= Simplify@P1 d = P1 w . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@P2 d = P2 w . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[53]:= FullSimplify@
P1 d = P1 w . P1 w ® P1 d . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
FullSimplify@P2 d =
P2 w . P2 w ® P2 d . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
FullSimplify@Pud = Puw . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[56]:=
Text@STAGE 1 D;
In[57]:= FullSimplify@Solve@D@Pud, yD  0, yDD
Out[57]= ::y ® -
432 m2 H1 + qL HΒ1 + Β2L
-k H7 - 72 mL2 + 216 m2 HΒ1 + Β2L2
>>
In[58]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[59]:= FullSimplify@D@D@Pud, yD, yD £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[59]= True
In[60]:=
Text@STAGE 1 RESULTSD;
In[61]:= yu = -
432 m2 H1 + qL HΒ1 + Β2L
-k H7 - 72 mL2 + 216 m2 HΒ1 + Β2L2
;
In[62]:= Simplify@wu = wd . y ® yuD;
Simplify@X1 u = X1 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@X2 u = X2 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@n1 u = n1 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@n2 u = n2 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P1 u = P1 d . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P2 u = P2 d . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P1 u =
P1 d . P1 d ® P1 u . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . n1 d ® n1 u . n2 d ® n2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P2 u = P2 d . P2 d ® P2 u . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . n1 d ® n1 u . n2 d ® n2 u .
y ® yuD;
Simplify@Puu = Pud . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@XTotal = X1 u + X2 uD;
In[73]:=
In[74]:=
Text@equilibriumD;
In[75]:= FullSimplify@yu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[75]= True
In[76]:= FullSimplify@wu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[76]= True
In[77]:= FullSimplify@X1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[77]= True
In[78]:= FullSimplify@X2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[78]= True
In[79]:= FullSimplify@P1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[79]= True
In[80]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[80]= True
In[81]:= FullSimplify@n1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[81]= True
In[82]:= FullSimplify@n2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[82]= True
In[83]:= FullSimplify@Puu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[83]= True
In[84]:= FullSimplify@P1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[84]= True
In[85]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[85]= True
In[86]:=
Text@Β1 effectsD;
In[87]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[87]= True
In[88]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[88]= True
In[89]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[89]= True
In[90]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[90]= True
In[91]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[91]= Β2 Ik H-7 + 48 mL H-7 + 72 mL + 216 m2 IΒ12 + Β22MM < 24 m Β1 Ik H-7 + 72 mL - 18 m Β22M
In[92]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 17 Β2<D
Out[92]= True
In[93]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 ³ 23 Β2<D
Out[93]= True
In[94]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[94]= True
In[95]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[95]= True
In[96]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[96]= True
In[97]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[97]= True
In[98]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[98]= True
In[99]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[99]= True
In[100]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[100]= True
In[101]:=
Text@Β2 effectsD;
In[102]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[102]= True
In[103]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[103]= 216 m2 Β13 + 60 k H7 - 72 mL m Β2 +
432 m2 Β12 Β2 + Β1 Ik H-7 + 12 mL H-7 + 72 mL + 216 m2 Β22M < 0
In[104]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 12 Β2<D
Out[104]= True
In[105]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 35 Β2<D
Out[105]= True
In[106]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[106]= 216 m2 Β13 + 60 k H7 - 72 mL m Β2 +
432 m2 Β12 Β2 + Β1 Ik H-7 + 12 mL H-7 + 72 mL + 216 m2 Β22M < 0
In[107]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 35 Β2<D
Out[107]= True
In[108]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 12 Β2<D
Out[108]= True
In[109]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[109]= 216 m2 Β13 + 60 k H7 - 72 mL m Β2 +
432 m2 Β12 Β2 + Β1 Ik H-7 + 12 mL H-7 + 72 mL + 216 m2 Β22M < 0
In[110]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 35 Β2<D
Out[110]= True
In[111]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 12 Β2<D
Out[111]= True
In[112]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[112]= True
In[113]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[113]= True
In[114]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[114]= True
In[115]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[115]= True
In[116]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[116]= True
In[117]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[117]= True
In[118]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[118]= True
In[119]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[119]= True
In[120]:=
Text@k effectsD;
In[121]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[121]= True
In[122]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[122]= True
In[123]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[123]= True
In[124]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[124]= True
In[125]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[125]= 12 m Β1 + H7 - 60 mL Β2 < 0
In[126]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 5 Β2<D
Out[126]= True
In[127]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 44 Β2<D
Out[127]= True
In[128]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[128]= 30 m Β1 + 7 H1 - 6 mL Β2 < 0
In[129]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 11 Β2<D
Out[129]= True
In[130]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, kD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 5 Β1 ³ 7 Β2<D
Out[130]= True
In[131]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[131]= 30 m Β1 + 7 H1 - 6 mL Β2 < 0
In[132]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[132]= 30 m Β1 + 7 H1 - 6 mL Β2 < 0
In[133]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[133]= True
In[134]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[134]= True
In[135]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[135]= True
In[136]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[136]= True
Text@m effectsD;
In[137]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, mD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[137]= True
In[138]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[138]= True
In[139]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[139]= k2 H7 - 72 mL2 H7 - 12 mL2 H49 + 216 mL <
432 m2 HΒ1 + Β2L I108 H49 - 204 mL m2 Β13 + 108 H49 - 204 mL m2 Β12 Β2 +
2 Β1 I7 k H-686 + 9 m H1057 + 12 m H-371 + 552 mLLL + 54 m2 H-49 + 204 mL Β22M +
Β2 Ik H2401 - 18 m H3871 + 12 m H-1883 + 3336 mLLL + 108 m2 H-49 + 204 mL Β22MM
In[140]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, mD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k ³ 7, q > 0<D
Out[140]= True
In[141]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, mD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 18 Β1 £ 19 Β2<D
Out[141]= True
In[142]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, mD < 0, 8Β1  0.8, Β2  0.1, m > 1, k  1.41, q > 0<D
Out[142]= True
In[143]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, mD > 0, 8Β1  0.8, Β2  0.1, m > 1, k  3.86, q > 0<D
Out[143]= True
In[144]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[144]= True
In[145]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, mD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[145]= True
In[146]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[146]= 432 m2 HΒ1 + Β2L I-108 m2 Β13 - 98 k H1 - 6 mL2 Β2 - 108 m2 Β12 Β2 + 108 m2 Β23 +
Β1 Ik H49 + 72 m H-14 + 47 mLL + 108 m2 Β22MM < k2 H7 - 72 mL2 H7 - 12 mL2
In[147]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k ³ 10, q > 0<D
Out[147]= True
In[148]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 13 Β1 £ 14 Β2<D
Out[148]= True
In[149]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, mD > 0, 8Β1  0.8, Β2  0.1, m > 1, k  1.19, q > 0<D
Out[149]= True
In[150]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, mD < 0, 8Β1  0.8, Β2  0.1, m > 1, k  6.21, q > 0<D
Out[150]= True
In[151]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, mD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[151]= True
In[152]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[152]= k2 H7 - 72 mL2 H7 - 12 mL2 +
12 m HΒ1 + Β2L I648 m3 Β13 + k H343 + 3 m H-1127 + 24 m H49 + 180 mLLL Β2 +
648 m3 Β12 Β2 - 648 m3 Β23 - 9 m Β1 I7 k H-7 + 8 m H-7 + 36 mLL + 72 m2 Β22MM > 0
In[153]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k ³ 2, q > 0<D
Out[153]= True
In[154]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 2 Β1 £ 3 Β2<D
Out[154]= True
In[155]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[155]= True
In[156]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[156]= True
In[157]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[157]= True
In[158]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, mD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[158]= True

APPENDIX A .5
In[1]:= Remove@"Global‘*"D
Remove::rmnsm :  There are no symbols matching "Global`*". 
In[2]:= Text@inverse demand for quality differentiated productsD;
Solve@x1 + x2 == 1 - Hp1 - y Β1L + q, p1D
Out[3]= 88p1 ® 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β1<<
In[4]:= Solve@x1 + x2 == 1 - Hp2 - y Β2L + q, p2D
Out[4]= 88p2 ® 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β2<<
In[5]:= p1 = 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β1;
p2 = 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β2;
In[7]:= P1 = x1 *Hp1 - w + n1L - m n1^2;
In[8]:= P2 = x2 *Hp2 - w + n2L - m n2^2;
In[9]:= Pup = Hx1 + x2L*w - k HyL^2;
In[10]:=
Text@STAGE 4D;
In[11]:= Solve@8D@P2, x2D  0<, 8x2<D
Out[11]= ::x2 ®
1
2
H1 + q - w + n2 - x1 + y Β2L>>
In[12]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[13]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P2, x2D, x2D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[13]= True
In[14]:= X2 a =
1
2
H1 + q - w + n2 - x1 + y Β2L;
In[15]:= Simplify@p1 a = p1 . x2 ® X2 aD;
Simplify@P1 a = P1 . p1 ® p1 aD;
In[17]:= Solve@8D@P1 a, x1D  0<, 8x1<D
Out[17]= ::x1 ®
1
2
H1 + q - w + 2 n1 - n2 + 2 y Β1 - y Β2L>>
In[18]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P1, x1D, x1D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[18]= True
In[19]:= Text@stability conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@P1, x1D, x1D*D@D@P2, x2D, x2D > D@D@P1, x1D, x2D*D@D@P2, x1D, x2D,
81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[20]= True
In[21]:=
Text@STAGE 4 RESULTSD;
In[22]:= X1 s =
1
2
H1 + q - w + 2 n1 - n2 + 2 y Β1 - y Β2L;
Simplify@X2 s = X2 a . x1 ® X1 sD;
In[24]:= Simplify@P1 s = p1 . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
Simplify@P2 s = p2 . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
In[26]:= Simplify@P1 s = P1 . p1 ® P1 s . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
Simplify@P2 s = P2 . p2 ® P2 s . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
SimplifyAPus = Pup . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sE;
In[29]:=
Text@STAGE 3D;
In[30]:= Simplify@Solve@D@Pus, wD  0, wDD
Out[30]= ::w ®
1
6
H3 + 3 q + 2 n1 + n2 + 2 y Β1 + y Β2L>>
In[31]:= Text@second order conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@Pus, wD, wD £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[32]= True
In[33]:=
Text@STAGE 3 RESULTSD;
In[34]:= ww =
1
6
H3 + 3 q + 2 n1 + n2 + 2 y Β1 + y Β2L;
In[35]:= Simplify@X1 w = X1 s . w ® wwD;
Simplify@X2 w = X2 s . w ® wwD;
In[37]:= Simplify@P1 w = P1 s . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
Simplify@P2 w = P2 s . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
In[39]:= FullSimplify@P1 w = P1 s . P1 s ® P1 w . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
FullSimplify@P2 w = P2 s . P2 s ® P2 w . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
FullSimplify@Puw = Pus . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
In[42]:=
Text@STAGE 2D;
In[43]:= Solve@8D@P1 w, n1D  0, D@P2 w, n2D  0<, 8n1, n2<D
Out[43]= ::n1 ®
5 H-17 + 24 m - 17 q + 24 m q - 17 y Β1 + 80 m y Β1 - 56 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
,
n2 ®
17 H-5 + 6 m - 5 q + 6 m q - 28 m y Β1 - 5 y Β2 + 34 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
>>
In[44]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[45]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P1 w, n1D, n1D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[45]= True
In[46]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P2 w, n2D, n2D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[46]= True
In[47]:= Text@stability conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@P1 w, n1D, n1D*D@D@P2 w, n2D, n2D > D@D@P1 w, n1D, n2D*D@D@P2 w, n1D, n2D,
81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[48]= True
In[49]:=
Text@STAGE 2 RESULTSD;
In[50]:= n1 d =
5 H-17 + 24 m - 17 q + 24 m q - 17 y Β1 + 80 m y Β1 - 56 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
;
n2 d =
17 H-5 + 6 m - 5 q + 6 m q - 28 m y Β1 - 5 y Β2 + 34 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
;
In[52]:= Simplify@X1 d = X1 w . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@X2 d = X2 w . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@wd = ww . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[55]:= Simplify@P1 d = P1 w . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@P2 d = P2 w . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[57]:= Simplify@P1 d = P1 w . P1 w ® P1 d . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@P2 d = P2 w . P2 w ® P2 d . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
FullSimplify@Pud = Puw . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . ww ® wd . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[60]:=
Text@STAGE 1 D;
In[61]:= FullSimplify@Solve@D@Pud, yD  0, yDD
Out[61]= ::y ® -
1728 m2 H-3 + 4 mL H1 + qL HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2L
-k H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL2 + 192 m2 HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2L2
>>
In[62]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[63]:= FullSimplify@D@D@Pud, yD, yD £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[63]= True
In[64]:=
Text@STAGE 1 RESULTSD;
In[65]:= yu = -
1728 m2 H-3 + 4 mL H1 + qL HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2L
-k H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL2 + 192 m2 HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2L2
;
In[66]:= FullSimplify@yu > 0, 8q > 0, w > 0, 1 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1<D
Out[66]= True
In[67]:= Simplify@wu = wd . y ® yuD;
Simplify@X1 u = X1 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@X2 u = X2 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@n1 u = n1 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@n2 u = n2 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P1 u = P1 d . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P2 u = P2 d . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P1 u = P1 d . P1 d ® P1 u . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . n1 d ® n1 u . n2 d ® n2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P2 u = P2 d . P2 d ® P2 u . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . n1 d ® n1 u . n2 d ® n2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@Puu = Pud . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@XTotal = X1 u + X2 uD;
In[78]:=
In[79]:=
Text@equilibriumD;
In[80]:= FullSimplify@yu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[80]= True
In[81]:= FullSimplify@wu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[81]= True
In[82]:= FullSimplify@X1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[82]= True
In[83]:= FullSimplify@X2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[83]= k H-5 + 6 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL > 192 m2 HΒ1 - Β2L HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2L
In[84]:= FullSimplify@X2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[84]= True
In[85]:= FullSimplify@P1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[85]= True
In[86]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[86]= True
In[87]:= FullSimplify@n1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[87]= True
In[88]:= FullSimplify@n2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[88]= k H-5 + 6 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL > 192 m2 HΒ1 - Β2L HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2L
In[89]:= FullSimplify@n2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[89]= True
In[90]:= FullSimplify@Puu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[90]= True
In[91]:= FullSimplify@P1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[91]= True
In[92]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[92]= Ik H-5 + 6 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL - 192 m2 HΒ1 - Β2L HH-17 + 24 mL Β1 + 2 H-5 + 6 mL Β2LM2 > 0
In[93]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[93]= True
In[94]:=
Text@Β1 effectsD;
In[95]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[95]= True
In[96]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[96]= True
In[97]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[97]= True
In[98]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[98]= True
In[99]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[99]= True
In[100]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[100]= True
In[101]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[101]= True
In[102]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[102]= True
In[103]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[103]= True
In[104]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[104]= True
In[105]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[105]= True
In[106]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[106]= True
In[107]:=
Text@Β2 effectsD;
In[108]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[108]= True
In[109]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[109]= True
In[110]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[110]= True
In[111]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[111]= True
In[112]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[112]= True
In[113]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[113]= True
In[114]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[114]= True
In[115]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[115]= True
In[116]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[116]= True
In[117]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[117]= True
In[118]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[118]= True
In[119]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 6 Β1 £ 7 Β2<D
Out[119]= True
APPENDIX A .6
In[1]:= Remove@"Global‘*"D
Remove::rmnsm :  There are no symbols matching "Global`*". 
In[2]:= Text@inverse demand for quality differentiated productsD;
Solve@x1 + x2 == 1 - Hp1 - y Β1L + q, p1D;
In[4]:= Solve@x1 + x2 == 1 - Hp2 - y Β2L + q, p2D;
In[5]:= p1 = 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β1;
p2 = 1 + q - x1 - x2 + y Β2;
In[7]:= P1 = x1 *Hp1 - w + n1L - m n1^2;
In[8]:= P2 = x2 *Hp2 - w + n2L - m n2^2;
In[9]:= Pup = Hx1 + x2L*w - k HyL^2;
In[10]:=
Text@STAGE 4D;
In[11]:= Solve@8D@P1, x1D  0<, 8x1<D
Out[11]= ::x1 ®
1
2
H1 + q - w + n1 - x2 + y Β1L>>
In[12]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[13]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P2, x2D, x2D £ 0, 8q > 0, w > 0, Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 0, k > 0<D
Out[13]= True
In[14]:= X1 a =
1
2
H1 + q - w + n1 - x2 + y Β1L;
In[15]:= Simplify@p2 a = p2 . x1 ® X1 aD;
Simplify@P2 a = P2 . p2 ® p2 a . x1 ® X1 aD;
In[17]:= Solve@8D@P2 a, x2D  0<, 8x2<D
Out[17]= ::x2 ®
1
2
H1 + q - w - n1 + 2 n2 - y Β1 + 2 y Β2L>>
In[18]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P1, x1D, x1D £ 0, 8q > 0, w > 0, Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 0, k > 0<D
Out[18]= True
In[19]:= Text@stability conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@P1, x1D, x1D*D@D@P2, x2D, x2D > D@D@P1, x1D, x2D*D@D@P2, x1D, x2D,
8q > 0, w > 0, Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 0, k > 0<D
Out[20]= True
In[21]:=
Text@STAGE 4 RESULTSD;
In[22]:= X2 s =
1
2
H1 + q - w - n1 + 2 n2 - y Β1 + 2 y Β2L;
Simplify@X1 s = X1 a . x2 ® X2 sD;
In[24]:= Simplify@P1 s = p1 . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
Simplify@P2 s = p2 . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
In[26]:= Simplify@P1 s = P1 . p1 ® P1 s . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
Simplify@P2 s = P2 . p2 ® P2 s . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sD;
SimplifyAPus = Pup . x1 ® X1 s . x2 ® X2 sE;
In[29]:=
Text@STAGE 3D;
In[30]:= Simplify@Solve@D@Pus, wD  0, wDD
Out[30]= ::w ®
1
6
H3 + 3 q + n1 + 2 n2 + y Β1 + 2 y Β2L>>
In[31]:= Text@second order conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@Pus, wD, wD £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[32]= True
In[33]:=
Text@STAGE 3 RESULTSD;
In[34]:= ww =
1
6
H3 + 3 q + n1 + 2 n2 + y Β1 + 2 y Β2L;
In[35]:= Simplify@X1 w = X1 s . w ® wwD;
Simplify@X2 w = X2 s . w ® wwD;
In[37]:= Simplify@P1 w = P1 s . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
Simplify@P2 w = P2 s . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
In[39]:= FullSimplify@P1 w = P1 s . P1 s ® P1 w . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
FullSimplify@P2 w = P2 s . P2 s ® P2 w . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
FullSimplify@Puw = Pus . X1 s ® X1 w . X2 s ® X2 w . w ® wwD;
In[42]:=
Text@STAGE 2D;
In[43]:= Solve@8D@P1 w, n1D  0, D@P2 w, n2D  0<, 8n1, n2<D
Out[43]= ::n1 ®
17 H-5 + 6 m - 5 q + 6 m q - 5 y Β1 + 34 m y Β1 - 28 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
,
n2 ®
5 H-17 + 24 m - 17 q + 24 m q - 56 m y Β1 - 17 y Β2 + 80 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
>>
In[44]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[45]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P1 w, n1D, n1D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[45]= True
In[46]:= FullSimplify@D@D@P2 w, n2D, n2D £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[46]= True
In[47]:= Text@stability conditionD;
FullSimplify@D@D@P1 w, n1D, n1D*D@D@P2 w, n2D, n2D > D@D@P1 w, n1D, n2D*D@D@P2 w, n1D, n2D,
81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[48]= True
In[49]:=
Text@STAGE 2 RESULTSD;
In[50]:= n1 d =
17 H-5 + 6 m - 5 q + 6 m q - 5 y Β1 + 34 m y Β1 - 28 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
;
n2 d =
5 H-17 + 24 m - 17 q + 24 m q - 56 m y Β1 - 17 y Β2 + 80 m y Β2L
85 - 978 m + 1152 m2
;
In[52]:= Simplify@X1 d = X1 w . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@X2 d = X2 w . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@wd = ww . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[55]:= Simplify@P1 d = P1 w . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@P2 d = P2 w . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[57]:= Simplify@P1 d = P1 w . P1 w ® P1 d . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
Simplify@P2 d = P2 w . P2 w ® P2 d . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
FullSimplify@Pud = Puw . X1 w ® X1 d . X2 w ® X2 d . ww ® wd . n1 ® n1 d . n2 ® n2 dD;
In[60]:=
Text@STAGE 1 D;
In[61]:= FullSimplify@Solve@D@Pud, yD  0, yDD
Out[61]= ::y ® -
1728 m2 H-3 + 4 mL H1 + qL H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L
-k H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL2 + 192 m2 H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L2
>>
In[62]:= Text@second order conditionD;
In[63]:= FullSimplify@D@D@Pud, yD, yD £ 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[63]= True
In[64]:=
Text@STAGE 1 RESULTSD;
In[65]:= yu = -
1728 m2 H-3 + 4 mL H1 + qL H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L
-k H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL2 + 192 m2 H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L2
;
In[66]:= FullSimplify@yu > 0, 8q > 0, w > 0, 1 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1<D
Out[66]= True
In[67]:= Simplify@wu = wd . y ® yuD;
Simplify@X1 u = X1 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@X2 u = X2 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@n1 u = n1 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@n2 u = n2 d . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P1 u = P1 d . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P2 u = P2 d . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P1 u = P1 d . P1 d ® P1 u . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . n1 d ® n1 u . n2 d ® n2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@P2 u = P2 d . P2 d ® P2 u . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . n1 d ® n1 u . n2 d ® n2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@Puu = Pud . X1 d ® X1 u . X2 d ® X2 u . y ® yuD;
Simplify@XTotal = X1 u + X2 uD;
In[78]:=
In[79]:=
Text@equilibriumD;
In[80]:= FullSimplify@yu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[80]= True
In[81]:= FullSimplify@wu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[81]= True
In[82]:= FullSimplify@X1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[82]= True
In[83]:= FullSimplify@X2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[83]= True
In[84]:= FullSimplify@P1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[84]= True
In[85]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[85]= True
In[86]:= FullSimplify@n1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[86]= True
In[87]:= FullSimplify@n2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[87]= True
In[88]:= FullSimplify@Puu > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[88]= True
In[89]:= FullSimplify@P1 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[89]= True
In[90]:= FullSimplify@P2 u > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[90]= True
In[91]:=
Text@Β1 effectsD;
In[92]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[92]= True
In[93]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[93]= True
In[94]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[94]= True
In[95]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[95]= True
In[96]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[96]= Β2 Ik H85 + 6 m H-95 + 96 mLL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL + 192 m2 I4 H5 - 6 mL2 Β12 + H17 - 24 mL2 Β22MM >
48 m H-5 + 6 mL Β1 Ik H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL + 16 H17 - 24 mL m Β22M
In[97]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 18 Β2<D
Out[97]= True
In[98]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 ³ 23 Β2<D
Out[98]= True
In[99]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[99]= True
In[100]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[100]= True
In[101]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β1D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[101]= True
In[102]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[102]= True
In[103]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[103]= True
In[104]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[104]= True
In[105]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, Β1D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[105]= True
In[106]:=
Text@Β2 effectsD;
In[107]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[107]= True
In[108]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[108]= Β1 Ik I85 - 418 m + 480 m2M H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL + 192 m2 H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L2M >
56 k m H-17 + 24 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL Β2
In[109]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 23 Β2<D
Out[109]= True
In[110]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 3 Β2<D
Out[110]= True
In[111]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[111]= Β1 Ik I85 - 418 m + 480 m2M H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL + 192 m2 H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L2M >
56 k m H-17 + 24 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL Β2
In[112]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 23 Β2<D
Out[112]= True
In[113]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 3 Β2<D
Out[113]= True
In[114]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[114]= Β1 Ik I85 - 418 m + 480 m2M H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL + 192 m2 H2 H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L2M >
56 k m H-17 + 24 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL Β2
In[115]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 10 Β1 £ 23 Β2<D
Out[115]= True
In[116]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 3 Β2<D
Out[116]= True
In[117]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[117]= True
In[118]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[118]= k H-17 + 24 mL H-17 + 80 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL Β2 +
Β1 I-k H-85 + 2 m H13 + 96 mLL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL - 192 H17 - 24 mL2 m2 Β22M >
768 m2 H-5 + 6 mL Β12 HH-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L
In[119]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 £ 3 Β2<D
Out[119]= True
In[120]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 10 Β2<D
Out[120]= True
In[121]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[121]= k H-17 + 24 mL H-17 + 80 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL Β2 +
Β1 I-k H-85 + 2 m H13 + 96 mLL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL - 192 H17 - 24 mL2 m2 Β22M >
768 m2 H-5 + 6 mL Β12 HH-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L
In[122]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 £ 3 Β2<D
Out[122]= True
In[123]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 10 Β2<D
Out[123]= True
In[124]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[124]= k H-17 + 24 mL H-17 + 80 mL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL Β2 +
Β1 I-k H-85 + 2 m H13 + 96 mLL H85 + 6 m H-163 + 192 mLL - 192 H17 - 24 mL2 m2 Β22M >
768 m2 H-5 + 6 mL Β12 HH-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-17 + 24 mL Β2L
In[125]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 £ 3 Β2<D
Out[125]= True
In[126]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, Β2D < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 10 Β2<D
Out[126]= True
In[127]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[127]= True
In[128]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[128]= True
In[129]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[129]= True
In[130]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, Β2D > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[130]= True
In[131]:=
Text@k effectsD;
In[132]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[132]= True
In[133]:= FullSimplify@D@X1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[133]= True
In[134]:= FullSimplify@D@P1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[134]= True
In[135]:= FullSimplify@D@n1 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[135]= True
In[136]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[136]= 56 m Β1 + H17 - 80 mL Β2 < 0
In[137]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, kD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 2 Β1 ³ 3 Β2<D
Out[137]= True
In[138]:= FullSimplify@D@X2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 8 Β1 £ 9 Β2<D
Out[138]= True
In[139]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[139]= 56 m Β1 + H17 - 80 mL Β2 < 0
In[140]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 2 Β1 ³ 3 Β2<D
Out[140]= True
In[141]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 8 Β1 £ 9 Β2<D
Out[141]= True
In[142]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[142]= 56 m Β1 + H17 - 80 mL Β2 < 0
In[143]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, kD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 2 Β1 ³ 3 Β2<D
Out[143]= True
In[144]:= FullSimplify@D@n2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 8 Β1 £ 9 Β2<D
Out[144]= True
In[145]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[145]= 24 m H-5 + 6 mL Β1 + H-85 + 18 H43 - 48 mL mL Β2 < 0
In[146]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD > 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, Β1 ³ 8 Β2<D
Out[146]= True
In[147]:= FullSimplify@D@P2 u, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0, 2 Β1 £ 11 Β2<D
Out[147]= True
In[148]:= FullSimplify@D@XTotal, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[148]= True
In[149]:= FullSimplify@D@wu, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[149]= True
In[150]:= FullSimplify@D@Puu, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[150]= True
In[151]:= FullSimplify@D@yu, kD < 0, 81 > Β1 > Β2 > 0, m > 1, k > 1, q > 0<D
Out[151]= True
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